


RECORD COPY

NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

by Bernard E. Brown

Department of Political Science
Vanderbilt University, U.S.A.



IIPA LIBRARY



Indian Institute of Public Administration

Books by the same author

American Conservatives: The Political Thought of FRANCIS
Lieber and John W. Burgess (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1951)

The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity (Homewood,
Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1960). With Roy C. Macridis.

Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood,
Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1961). With Roy C. Macridis.

PREFACE

The five chapters of this book are a slightly expanded version of lectures delivered at the Indian Institute of Public Administration in December, 1961. The central theme is that comparison of political systems — provided the comparison is significant and some explanation of similarities and differences is undertaken — may yield a deeper understanding of the systems under review than a descriptive approach to each one. The first chapter deals with the nature of comparative analysis and surveys recent trends in the discipline. The three chapters which follow are attempts to apply the comparative method to a few selected topics — interaction between the people and the government through political parties, the shifting balance among the public powers, and the role of armies in the rivalry for power. Finally, there is an over-all comparison of traditional and modern nations and an assessment of trends in the non-Western world.

The term "new directions" is used here as a contrast to the customary comparison of documents and political institutions. In fact an attempt to relate political and social structures, far from being "new", is but a ^{CONTINUATION} ~~revival~~ of the great tradition of Aristotle's Politics. Nor is there any intention to disparage the work done in the past. The goal is to supplement, not replace, the body of knowledge already in existence concerning individual governments.

Although limitations of space and time precluded a comprehensive analysis of the whole field, the argument nonetheless touches upon several vital questions of comparative politics. All of the topics here discussed should be of special interest to those concerned with the fate of democracy in the developing nations. If these lectures direct the attention of Indian students of political science to problems of comparative analysis, and suggest lines for further inquiry, they will have served their purpose.

I am grateful to Professor V. K. M. Menon, Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, for inviting me to give this course of lectures, and also for many discussions concerning Indian politics. Dean C. J. Chacko and Professor N. Srinivasan made it possible for me to present these views before graduate students at the University of Delhi and the Indian School of Public Administration. John A. Vieg, Professor of Government at the Claremont Graduate School and Fulbright Research Professor in India (1961-62), was kind enough to review and criticize a first draft. Albert Corvine, Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College and consultant to the Pakistan Administrative Staff College at Lahore, also made helpful suggestions. My debt to Roy C. Macridis should be obvious throughout, especially in the first chapter. Thanks are also due ^{To} Vanderbilt University, and particularly ^{To} Professor Avery Leiserson, chairman of the Department of Political Science,

To /

To /

for the opportunity to spend a year abroad. Needless to say, the sole responsibility for the content of this book rests with the author.

S. E. B.

New Delhi
December, 1961.

I. THE NEW DIRECTIONS

The subject to be discussed here — comparative politics — shares the character and goals of political science, the general discipline of which it is a branch. There is no magic in comparative politics by means of which the great problems of our time can be made to disappear. It is not a bag of tricks. The reason for studying government comparatively is the same as the reason for studying government at all — to gain an understanding of the State in all its ramifications and, if possible, to clarify problems, evaluate the consequences of alternative courses of action, and aid men in their capacities both as citizens and as rulers. Comparative politics is distinctive in only one way (though this is crucial): as a method of analysis.

Recently there has been a surge of interest in comparative politics. A great deal of experimentation is now going on with new approaches, new definitions, new research tools. Perhaps the main reason for the present intellectual ferment is a widespread feeling of disappointment and dissatisfaction with the traditional descriptive approach to the subject.

Comparative government, as it is customarily taught in university departments of political science, is not comparative at all. It is the study of foreign political systems, one by one. Attention is generally centered on the major powers of North America and Europe — the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, with occasional

references to Germany, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. Additional countries may be added to the list according to the interests and competence *of the lecturer.* The student thus becomes familiar with the *political* institutions of a number of countries in addition to his own — in itself a most praiseworthy objective.

The advantages of the "country-by-country" approach are so great that they doubtless outweigh the disadvantages. Not the least of these advantages from the prosaic viewpoint of the hard worked professor is the existence of first rate monographic studies and textbooks on individual political systems. There is a rich literature on the politics of each of the major powers. Every student should be familiar with the works of Harold Laski and Ivor Jennings on Britain, André Siegfried and Maurice Duverger on France, Franz Neumann and A.J.P. Taylor on Germany, Arthur Holcombe and Clinton Rossiter on the United States, Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro on the Soviet Union — to cite but a handful. Also, a nation's political system should be viewed in the context of its social, cultural and historical traditions, which form a living, developing whole. The student must grasp the total configuration before he can pretend to an understanding of any of the parts. Knowledge of foreign political systems in their integral entirety is also an essential element of a liberal education, and that alone is justification enough.

Nonetheless, the study of individual political systems has serious drawbacks. It is the awareness of

these limitations which has led to so many recent attempts to work out new approaches. Perhaps the basic weakness is that descriptive knowledge of foreign countries is not cumulative. Interesting information is acquired about selected nations, but no effort is made to relate these systems to each other. The student, in tackling one country after another, adds to his store of knowledge, but not necessarily to his understanding of general problems. If a diplomat is assigned to, say, France, he should obviously become acquainted with its history and institutions. If then transferred to Burma, the same kind of study would be desirable. But why should a student of politics examine France and then Burma? Or Switzerland, Denmark, Italy and so on? The result is to put one layer of knowledge on top of another, and so on until the observer runs out of countries, time or interest. This might be referred to irreverently as the "layer cake" approach.

It should rather be our goal to make significant comparisons between political systems, that is, to relate political phenomena in diverse settings. But what is a "significant comparison?" Sometimes similar sections of written constitutions are simply placed next to each other, on the apparent assumption that a profound conclusion can be read off. Thus, there are numerous comparisons of the bills of rights in the American, French, Soviet

and Indian constitutions; of federalism in the American, Swiss, Soviet and Indian constitutions; of parliamentary procedure, judicial review, political parties, civil service recruitment, and so on, in diverse countries. The aspiration is worthy — to avoid the concoction of a layer cake. In practice the result is often the same, except that the layers are more numerous and thinner. What purpose is served, for example, by describing parliamentary procedure first in the United States and then in Great Britain, France and other countries? The failure to relate political systems to each other cannot be redeemed by the failure to relate individual institutions to each other. Indeed if a choice had to be made between the customary, or "country-by-country" approach and the comparison of constitutional documents and political institutions, I should unhesitatingly choose the former. It is far better to see a nation's political institutions as a whole than to break them into little pieces so that they can be placed next to other little pieces in some kind of multi-national mosaic.

The comparative method is of great utility; but it does not consist of cutting up the pages of any standard textbook on major political powers and then reassembling them in a different order. Comparison is significant only if it seeks to interpret political data in terms of hypotheses or theories. Interpretation must deal with institutions as they really function — which sometimes differs radically from the way in which they are supposed to function.

It is also desirable that agreement be reached on the frame within which research is to be pursued. The comparative method thus requires an insistence on the scientific nature of inquiry, a focus on political behavior, and orientation of research within a broad analytic scheme.

The key point is the use of scientific method — otherwise the discipline will never succeed in establishing relationships among factors and systems. This does not mean that all inquiry into political affairs must be made to follow a set pattern or that prose be replaced by mathematics. It is unrealistic to expect all students of politics to use any one particular style or formula. Science basically means adherence to a general method of analysis; it is compatible with a variety of research techniques.

In its essentials the procedure characteristic of scientific inquiry in any field is first, to state and clarify competing hypotheses, then to verify them in the light of available evidence. Those hypotheses or theories not disproved by our knowledge of reality are provisionally accepted as true, subject to modification or rejection at a later date. This is perhaps not the place for a discussion of the philosophy of the social sciences. My intention is merely to point out that concern for development of scientific inquiry into politics is the main force behind the search for "new directions" in comparative politics. Those who reject the scientific method and its application to political problems will also be indifferent to the

to the need for comparative analysis of politics.

Let me therefore deal, cursorily, with a few of the main objections to the consideration of politics as a science. It is claimed that "science" requires objectivity, and that men cannot be objective about politics since their view of the world is determined by irrational values. It is also contended that hypotheses concerning physical reality can be verified while theories of politics are always in dispute. Hence, social science cannot aspire to certainty.

These objections rest upon a misconception of the nature of science, though they are partly a justifiable reaction to excessive claims. It is true that men acquire through their membership in a particular society certain values or myths concerning the nature of political authority. If they seek only to justify these myths, then all social science is impossible. But if they subject value systems to critical analysis, free them of ambiguities and confusion, isolate their central meaning, and state them as hypotheses to be tested by reference to reality, then the basic condition of scientific inquiry is met. Indeed, the existence of values is not an obstacle to scientific analysis; it is rather the starting point. How else can the enormous mass of facts confronting us be approached unless they are first selected and arranged on the basis of a theory?

The objection that social science can never achieve the certainty and predictability of physical science is only

partly sound. Hypotheses concerning the quality and behavior of physical matter are remarkably short-lived. The sweeping changes which have taken place in physics and chemistry during the past century indicate how tentative are formulations even in natural science. It might be argued that some of the political theories expounded by Aristotle, or John Stuart Mill, or the authors of The Federalist Papers have stood the test of time better than contemporary doctrines of chemistry, for example. Let it be conceded, however, that hypotheses concerning political behavior can never be fully verified because of the complex, shifting, and ever changing nature of the political universe. Prediction may well be impossible in politics as in history, economics or any other social discipline — though broad lines of development, dependent upon certain material conditions, might be identified successfully. But prediction and absolute certainty are not the goals of social science. The purpose of posing problems, clarifying propositions and amassing evidence is to gain an understanding of the subject under investigation. Of course there is ultimately an element of irrationality in political discourse. Some men can never be convinced by any demonstration of error. But our goal is greater comprehension, not the winning of supporters.

Ideally, the analysis of political problems could be of considerable aid to both the ordinary citizen and those who have responsibility for governing. The "science of

politics" here outlined could provide a framework within which somewhat more intelligent decisions can be made. The social sciences are not branches of either alchemy or astrology, yet they can make important contributions to the art of government. In any event, what choice do we have? Is the obfuscation^s of values to be preferred to clarification? Is suppression of evidence better than its accumulation? Is imposition of political values by force more desirable than rational and independent discussion? There is no alternative to the use of scientific method in political inquiry, even though the achievements may be limited.¹

The student of politics is also under the obligation to investigate the actual behavior of citizens and rulers, not merely the idealistic objectives laid down in written documents. This should not be considered acceptance of all the work done by self-styled "behaviorists". One can hardly be other than skeptical concerning the value of systematic interviews if they are taken too seriously (for example, if answers to questions are given code numbers and then analyzed quantitatively). Reality is not necessarily what people tell interviewers, though the results of such surveys are frequently of interest. A good basic rule is never to believe anything anyone says unless it can be checked independently. Political behavior should not be confused with irresponsible, uninformed, unreliable chatter. There is an unfortunate tendency on the part of some social scientists to select problems and conduct inquiry along

lines dictated by the research tools at their disposal. Hypotheses will be formulated of such a nature that they can be "tested" by asking questions, codifying answers and running cards through a machine. There is a real danger of thus reducing political science to an unduly trivial level, wholly apart from serious questions which might be raised concerning methodology. We must be resolutely interested in political behavior — which is neither legal mythology nor baby talk.

The purpose of comparative analysis (which is, to repeat, both scientific and behavioral) is the same as that of the customary description of individual political systems one-by-one. It is to understand the political process. The case for comparative analysis is that it is a more effective and satisfactory way of gaining such an understanding than mere description. Let us assume, for example, that we wish to analyze the system of separation of powers and checks and balances in the United States. It is incumbent upon the observer to familiarize himself with the nature and functioning of American political institutions. Thus, we note that the first three articles of the Constitution establish the great branches of government. Article I vests legislative power in Congress, Article II vests executive power in the President, and Article III places the judicial power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may create. The Constitution also allocates to each of these branches some powers bearing on the other two branches,

thereby creating a system of checks and balances. Nowhere in the Constitution is it stated why this structure has been devised. Description of these constitutional provisions, of the evolution of each branch of government since 1789, and also of the actual status of the relations between the branches, is of course essential to an understanding of American government.

Comparative analysis would not replace such a description; it rather provides another way of looking at the system. We could begin with the theory justifying this unique political structure, which is expounded in The Federalist Papers, especially numbers 10, 47 and 51. James Madison in particular summed up the thinking of the Founding Fathers by arguing that the concentration of legislative, executive and judicial powers in the same hands or the same group of hands "would be the very definition of tyranny." Hence, it is necessary in order to preserve the freedom of the citizenry to separate these powers of government, and to give each branch sufficient power to defend itself against encroachment by the other two. The whole scheme is based on a pessimistic view of the governing process. If angels were to govern men, declared Madison, such checks would be unnecessary. But since angels do not govern men, then only power can check power.

The Federalist thus puts forth a general proposition concerning the relationship between freedom and power. Comparative analysis requires the examination of this theory or hypothesis in the light of evidence presented by several

political systems, not just the American. Does it appear that freedom is less secure where power is concentrated in the hands of a cabinet (which, because of party discipline, controls the Parliament) than in nations where executive and legislative bodies are rigorously independent of each other? Even cursory review shows that tyranny has somehow been avoided in Great Britain, but not in a number of Latin American states whose constitutions established a scheme of separation of powers.

Here is the crucial step in comparative analysis: How can these differences be explained? Obviously constitutional structure cannot entirely account for the differences in the operation of presidential and parliamentary systems in, let us say, the United States, Brazil, Great Britain and Ghana. It is necessary to introduce other factors, such as the nature of political parties, the quality of administrative services, and underlying attitudes of the principal social forces. The comparative technique compels us to reexamine (in this instance) the American political system in order to understand the way in which it functions. We are thus drawn away from mere description. Comparison leads to questioning, probing, system^aization, and explanation.²

A great deal of comparative analysis has been ^{DEVOTED TO} carried ~~out on an institutional level.~~ There have been many comparative studies, for example, of the position of the speakers of lower chambers, of cabinets, legislative committees,

electoral arrangements, and so on. All attempts to explain differences between countries in institutional terms invariably turn out to be inadequate. Nevertheless, it is the best way to introduce students to comparative analysis. In the process of disproving the theory, the student is backed into the vital sector of comparative politics. He begins to see the institutions as part of a larger political and social whole.

Most comparative theories about institutions are confined to Western Europe and North America. To cite but one illustration: the view is commonly held that a two party system developed in Britain rather than France because in the former country the cabinet possessed and used the power to dissolve Parliament. Thus, the argument runs, members of Parliament realize that the outcome of a vote of no confidence may be dissolution rather than resignation of the cabinet. Hence they are disposed to accept the cabinet's lead. In France the deputies had no fear of retaliation on the part of the cabinet, and so could vote against their party leadership and against the cabinet. This theory was frequently espoused by advocates of parliamentary reform in France during the Third and Fourth Republics.

The defects of this explanation are readily evident. Power to dissolve in fact existed under the Third and Fourth Republics, but was used only twice (1877 and 1955). After 1877 this power atrophied because it became identified by

good Republicans as a weapon of the Right. Nor is it at all clear that the British cabinet's power to dissolve is the force that creates discipline within the majority party -- which after all remains well disciplined even in the year or so preceding an election, when presumably the matter of timing makes little difference to the average member. That is, the nature of the power to dissolve depends on the political party system, exactly what it purports to explain! The next -- and vital -- step would be to account for differences between the British and French parties in terms other than political institutions.³ The inadequacy of institutional (or "narrow gauge") theories is especially evident if the field of study is extended to include the "non-Western" systems. Some of the new nations of Africa have copied quite closely the British model (power of dissolution, and all), yet their party systems remain quite different from that of Britain.

Theories on a relatively low level of abstraction always lead to the conclusion that differences between political systems can only be explained in terms of the societies in which they have taken root and developed historically. This is a comforting dictum for the political scientist, but it raises further questions. How can those differences be explained? It is hardly enough to fall back on vague formulations, like "social structure", "ideological conflict", or "lack of consensus". These terms must be clarified and related to ascertainable political behavior. It is precisely in this area that the most fruitful work in the field of

comparative politics is now being carried on -- at a "middle level" of abstraction.

"Middle range theories" are defined by the sociologist Robert K. Merton as being intermediate on the one hand, to "the minor working hypotheses evolved in abundance during the day-to-day routines of research" and, on the other, to "the all-inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual scheme from which it is hoped to derive a very large number of empirically observed uniformities of social behavior."⁴ That is, they are neither trivial nor metaphysical and can be tested out by research. Middle range theories in comparative politics are always attempts to relate political phenomena to social, economic or cultural factors.

It might be useful to review, briefly, some of the representative "middle range" theories in comparative politics. To summarize, such theories must lend themselves to formulation as hypotheses, they must lead to attempts at verification on the basis of experience in diverse states, and they must relate political behavior to other factors. In other words, they must not rest content with explanation of political problems simply in terms of political institutions.

Perhaps the best known and most influential of these theories is the economic interpretation of politics. Economic determinism is as old as political philosophy itself. In Plato's dialogues the sophist argues that "justice is the interest of the stronger", and Socrates' rejoinder is not

altogether convincing. That is, the rules of justice and indeed of the whole political system reflect and protect the economic interests of the dominant social group. This theme constantly reappears - in the work particularly of Karl Marx and, in the contemporary period, in the writings of Charles Beard, Harold Laski, and a host of others. Marx distinguished between the material basis of a society - level of technology, state of scientific progress, and the character of its ^{CLASS} relationships - and the "superstructure" resting upon it. In his view, the state is merely the prime instrument of the ruling class. Here is an incisive and sweeping explanation of the political process in all known systems: ancient, feudal, capitalist and socialist. It is readily applicable to the whole field of comparative politics, and indeed in the nineteenth century served as a healthy corrective to the traditional concern of historians with kings, mistresses and battles.

However, as is the case with all single factor theories, the economic interpretation is not wholly satisfactory. This is not the place for an extensive review of Marxism, but the total inaccuracy of the Marxist analysis of proletarian movements in capitalist countries indicates that something has been left out. The working class is supposed to become increasingly revolutionary as capitalism develops; instead it turns to "reformist" trade unionism. "Proletarian" revolution, curiously, is most likely to occur in countries which have no proletariat. Nonetheless, the questions raised by Marx must be dealt with by every student of comparative

politics. In spite of its serious shortcoming and contradictions, Marxist theory illuminates at least an aspect of the political process.

EW / Another approach is to review political systems in terms of the outlets provided to various personality types. A group of sociologists and psychologists, for example, have attempted to establish relationships between ethnocentrism and the tendency to support right-wing authoritarian movements. They interviewed a large number of children and adults, who were questioned on such matters as racial and national superiority, the place of children and parents in the family, and political attitudes. In another study, former members of the Communist parties of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy were interviewed intensively in order to ascertain whether there is any particular personality type to which communism appeals. Psychological theory has also been applied to politics in the "developing" nations. One observer identifies a number of factors which break up traditional societies and move them toward modernization. These include urbanization, growing literacy, development of trade, and above all something called "empathy" -- the psychological ability to adjust to new situations.⁵

Yet the psychological interpretation also has its limitations; it always leaves something unexplained. Why, for example, do authoritarian movements gather strength at one time rather than another, why is communism a mass movement in some countries and non-existent in others, and where does

empathy come from? In spite of the shortcomings of the psychological approach, it is probable that political systems are somehow related to the dominant personality patterns in a given society. The authoritarian nature of parent-child relations in nineteenth century Prussia and the relatively informal family structure of the United States are doubtless connected in some fashion to the political structure of those countries. This is an area which has been unduly neglected, and more research is needed.

Political systems may also be fruitfully compared in terms of their elite structure, that is, by study of those who control the instrumentalities of power. Most of us would readily accept G. Mosca's contention that in all existing societies there is a "ruling class". The number of those who govern is always relatively small, while those who are governed constitute the overwhelming majority in all nations, whether democratic or totalitarian, traditional or modern. Comparative study would involve identification of the power holders, the social groups from which they are characteristically drawn, and their position in the society. Analysis of elites provides a fresh perspective for the examination of any political system.

The discipline of comparative politics has been virtually reoriented in recent years by the widespread influence of sociological theory, particularly "structure-function analysis". The difficulty in comparison of institutions in several countries is that generally they do not perform the same

functions. Thus, the Congress of the United States and the British Parliament differ substantially in terms of their place and role within the political system. Political compromises are worked out in large measure by give-and-take within the Congress; this is done to a much lesser extent in the House of Commons, where the majority party is in firm control and tolerates no modification of cabinet proposals. In terms of the function of arriving at a working compromise among rival social groups and policies, the majority party in Great Britain is almost the equivalent of the American parties, Congress and President put together. That is, agreement worked out in the political branches of the United States government is achieved in Britain at the party level; little negotiation occurs beyond that point. Comparison of British and American government which fails to take this into account will be utterly misleading.

To cite another example, in comparing Western and Communist governments the usual approach is to emphasize the contrasts and differences — free elections versus controlled elections, existence of legal opposition versus suppression of opposition, safeguards for individuals versus a political police, and so on. No one would deny the importance of these contrasts. However, a deeper understanding of both Western and Soviet government might be obtained by asking another kind of question. In all political systems some provision must be made to enable the principal social forces

to express themselves, put forward claims, and gain access to the decision-makers. How is this done in, say, the American and Russian systems? In the United States this function is carried out in diverse ways — through pressure groups, political parties, and in complicated negotiations within Congress and between Congress and the President. The major organized groups enjoy a great deal of autonomy, but their demands are somehow coordinated and decisions made. In the Soviet Union similar associations (e.g., trade unions, collective farms, the armed forces, scientific and managerial groups) have no recognized autonomy, yet they are frequently able to apply pressure in a variety of subtle ways. The process of coordination takes place mainly within the framework of the ruling party, though to a certain extent within the administrative system as well. Parliament plays an insignificant role in this regard.

P / Structure-function analysis can be made systematic by drawing up a list of functions which must be performed in every political system. There are some things that must get done if a State is to be a going concern. ~~For example,~~ all political systems must generate a theory of legitimacy (otherwise its decisions will not be accepted), maintain channels between government and the principal social groups, and establish effective decision-making agencies. Whether these functions are performed through a one, two or multi-party system, for example, somehow they must take place.

The analysis of structures in terms of functions being discharged in the political process should make possible ~~not~~ ~~only~~ more intelligent comparisons, ^{AND,} but, [^]above all, a better understanding of each of the systems under examination.

Another sociological concept of considerable impact on comparative politics is that of the "ideal-type", as developed particularly by Max Weber. This is an analytic model through which a variety of factors -- social, economic, cultural and political -- can be related to each other. Weber's definition of "traditional" and "modern" types of authority is based on clusters of characteristics, including family structure, value systems, economic activity, bureaucratic recruitment, and so on. It is not intended to describe any single existing society, but rather to draw up a check list for research into all societies. The virtue of this approach is to call attention to interrelationships which might otherwise elude the observer. It is especially relevant to analysis of the political process in the developing nations.⁶

All of these "middle level" theories or concepts are useful, even though each one has its special limitations. They can all be framed, in at least a loose literary fashion, as hypotheses or theses on the basis of which investigation can be conducted. The study of comparative politics is thus becoming increasingly concerned with rational or scientific analysis, the verification of theories, the accumulation of generalized knowledge. Some hold out the hope that eventually it might be possible to predict the course of political development, as we acquire more and more information concerning the

C | ← operation of political systems. That hope, it seems to me, will never be realized. There are too many irrational lurches in human affairs ever to make faultless prediction feasible. It may also be wondered whether a completely predictable world would be a comfortable place in which to live. An element of uncertainty enhances the significance of human and individual will. Perhaps we will never achieve a passionless, "objective" view of reality. Nonetheless, the gradual extension of the boundaries of verifiable knowledge is one of the worthiest objectives which any student of politics can set for himself. To make even modest progress in that direction should be a major purpose of our discipline.

The many trends in comparative politics now being summarized all point in a particular direction — to the formulation of a theory of the political system as a whole.

Each theorist has his own pet proposal, but all recognize the desirability of viewing the political process in its entirety. The great advantage of beginning with a systematic theory is that it helps direct research activities along more significant lines and enables us to see interrelationships more readily. Instead of putting together odd bits of research in the hope that somehow they will add up to a perspective view of politics, we begin with a comprehensive theory in terms of which the various aspects of the political process may then be investigated.

Let me sketch the main outlines of a theory of the political system — which in effect is a distillation of the views put forth by a great many students of comparative politics. It is hardly likely that this particular scheme will win universal acceptance! But no matter: the important thing is that a comprehensive political theory should establish relationships among political, social and all other relevant factors.

Every political system has four major components: the government, the group universe, the value constellation, and a pattern of policy. A complete study of a nation's political system would have to include all of these components. Each one may also be taken separately as a significant category for research and investigation.

In every political system known to us there is always a mechanism (consisting of offices, agencies, institutions, and the like) by means of which decisions are formulated and carried out. In a primitive system this may be the function of tribal chiefs and priests who interpret immemorial custom; in a modern system there are complex institutions in a variety of arrangements. Whatever structure exists must be considered legitimate by the overwhelming mass of the people affected, otherwise the government is unstable and doomed to disappear. Even an absolute monarchy must be recognized in principle as legitimate by its subjects (wholly apart from their loyalty to a particular chief) or all

the troops at the command of the sovereign will not be able to maintain his rule. All governments both generate and reflect a pattern of legitimacy, that is, they justify themselves in terms of some general theory of governance (such as divine right, representative democracy, communism, fascism, or simple national identity). Decisions are thus obeyed not merely because punishment is meted out to recalcitrants, but, ^{ALSO BECAUSE} the procedure used to arrive at these decisions is accepted by the community. Should the legitimacy of the state ever be widely questioned, the effectiveness of the government would be seriously impaired.

Decisions are not made in a vacuum. In any modern or industrial society there exist networks of groups, organized around special economic or social interests, which formulate demands and press claims upon each other and the government. In addition to the major groupings of business, labor and agriculture, there are a host of other associations and interests: scientists, university professors, journalists, managers, accountants, teachers, civil servants, lay Catholics and so on endlessly. Political decisions involve mainly the reconciliation and coordination of ^{THEIR} ~~such~~ demands. In dictatorial regimes, the emphasis is always on coordination of group activities in order to achieve some larger objective (usually preparation for war or protection of the regime).

But the regime in turn cannot escape a certain amount of pressure from the groups. The difficulties experienced

by the Nazis in their relations with the Army General Staff and the perennial problem of the peasantry in Russia are alike reminders that groups manage to maintain some autonomy even under extreme circumstances. In representative democracies groups have the acknowledged right to organize and put forward demands openly. Indeed these constitute the raw material of democratic politics. How demands are fed into the system and then reconciled depends upon the nature of the political institutions and the leadership of a nation. But the main channels for interaction between groups and the government in all modern systems (whether democratic or dictatorial) are political parties.

Each of the major social groups tends to associate itself with a distinctive interpretation of politics or ideology. It may be both a rationalization of the group's interests and an attempt to perceive and change reality. In any case, the social and political conflict in a society is paralleled by a complex clash of ideologies. Socialist, communist, liberal and fascist ideologies are all loosely related to the pattern of group or social activity in a given country, though they cannot be reduced entirely to class terms.

Comparative study of ideologies involves an attempt to explain why the substantive content of ideologies may vary from country to country (such as conservatism in the United States and Great Britain, communism or socialism in Europe and Asia, and fascism in Spain, Italy and Germany). It should

also explain why the same social groups in certain countries develop different ideologies (for example, the working class, businessmen and farmers in the United States, Britain, Scandinavia and France). These differences and similarities can only be accounted for in terms of such factors as the effectiveness of political parties, the existence of habits of compromise, the tradition of political leadership, the productivity of the economy, and so on. Study of ideological trends among key groups like the ~~Army~~ and the intellectuals is especially important during periods of rapid political change. The nature and intensity of ideological conflict provides valuable clues to the degree of stability or instability in a given system. Thus, virtually every aspect of a political system can be illuminated by examination of the relationship between groups and ideologies.

Finally, some attention should be paid to the content of the decisions arrived at by government. The making of decisions is not an abstract mathematical exercise; it involves policy. A group's position within both its society and its political system can be at least roughly measured by comparing its minimal demands with the policy which finally emerges out of the welter of conflicting claims. Again, it is necessary to explain why different policies have been produced by states whose economic level and social structure are roughly the same. This would constitute an additional check on investigation within the other analytic categories.

The individual parts of the political system are all linked together in organic fashion. Politics is dynamic and ever changing, usually in response to some historic challenge which affects large areas of the world at the same time. The nature of the crisis through which the system is going will generally determine the kind of problems that occupy the attention of social scientists. For example, during the break up of feudalism in Europe, political philosophers were mainly concerned with the creation of more rational institutions. For over a century the most persistent political issues have been generated by industrialization. Technological advance has brought into existence whole new social categories -- traders, merchants and businessmen, the working class, managers (both private and public), scientists, engineers, a professional army^{OFFICERS,} and so on. These groups make demands upon the system as a whole and under certain conditions may question the legitimacy of the established political order. Each system must meet the challenge of satisfying the claims of new social groups while at the same time maintaining the loyalty of the established groups. Industrialized nations are faced with the permanent need to increase productivity and ensure an equitable distribution of wealth. The challenges confronting the so-called "developing" nations are staggering. They must not only modernize their economies, but completely reshape their social structures and value systems as well. Probably the most significant hypotheses in the field of comparative politics in our time will relate to the political consequences and conditions of economic development.⁷

FOOTNOTES, CHAPTER ONE, THE NEW DIRECTIONS

1. There is an enormous literature on the nature of scientific method and its application to political problems. Perhaps the best introduction is Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, An Essay in the Meaning of Scientific Method (2nd edition; New York, 1953). Some political aspects of Cohen's philosophy are dealt with in my early article, "Morris Cohen's Search for Justice," Journal of the History of Ideas, April 1953. Arnold Brecht's monumental work, Political Theory, The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought (Princeton, 1959) — especially the section on scientific method — is indispensable. It contains an extensive bibliography on methodological questions.

2. Throughout this chapter I have drawn freely upon the writings of my colleague, Roy C. Macridis. See in particular his Study of Comparative Government (New York, 1955), and our joint volume, Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Ill., 1961), especially part one.

3. For an excellent critique along these lines, see Leslie Lipson, "The Two Party System in British Politics," American Political Science Review, June 1953 (also reproduced in Comparative Politics, op. cit., pp. 198-210).

4. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), p.5. A notable recent book in this tradition is Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, 1960).

5. The works referred to are T. Adorno, et.al., The Authoritarian Personality (1950); Gabriel Almond, The Appeals of Communism (1954); and Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (1958).

6. Examples of the "middle level" theories here discussed may be found in Comparative Politics, op. cit., pp. 29-79. On "system theory", ibid., pp.80-111.

7. I do not wish to minimize the importance of the "great issues" in politics. The political scientist is always under the obligation to consider the larger, ethical questions — unless he is resigned to blind acceptance of every ideology or value which happens to dominate a given group or nation at any particular time. In these lectures, however, I am deliberately confining my interest to the political process and system.

II. PARTIES

Max Weber's definition of a party is useful for placing the subject in broad social perspective. Parties, he suggested, are specialized associations whose purpose is to secure power within a corporate group for their leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages. They may spring up within trade unions, corporations, universities, parliaments, or the state itself -- in which latter case they are political parties. Parties are thus specialized associations within specialized associations and become more complex, organized and bureaucratic as a society approaches the modern "type."

It is therefore understandable that political parties were not studied systematically until the turn of the century. John Stuart Mill's treatise On Representative Government, written in 1861, contained an extensive plea for proportional representation but no analysis of parties. Similarly, it is only recently that the "group universe" received adequate attention from students of politics. Partly as a result of the influence of Arthur F. Bentley's Process of Government, published in 1908, there is now a rich monographic literature on American pressure groups. Indeed, there has long been a general impression that lobbies are peculiarly American phenomena. It was with a sense of mingled surprise and horror that British political scientists discovered the existence of these "reprehensible" ²organizations in their country, too. One thoughtful observer has concluded

that British pressure groups are far stronger than the American. The first full length analysis of French pressure groups did not appear until 1958, and there is some evidence that they are more important in the political process of France than in the supposed home of lobbies, the United States.¹

The attitude of professional observers towards political parties, to return to our main subject, has undergone an interesting evolution. At first, parties were universally denounced as selfish, venal and corrupt; they were part of the pathology of politics. The term "faction" in the late 18th and early 19th centuries was one of opprobrium. A typical view was expressed by James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 10, when he said that a faction by definition is injurious to the public good. The stated purpose of the Constitution was to control the effects of these nefarious groups. Ostrogorski's magistral study of American parties was in essence a bitter denunciation of parties and all their works. His description of the national conventions remains a classic indictment of the nominating process in the United States. James Bryce echoed the view that parties encroached upon and undermined the democratic process. In the ideal democracy, he argued, each individual citizen is intelligent and impartial. The soundest arguments and best candidates will win out. But politicians discover that the citizen is neither informed nor interested -- nor perhaps

even intelligent. Hence the politicians endeavor to organize voters instead of persuade them. "Organization and discipline" warned Bryce, "mean the growth of a party spirit which is in itself irrational, impelling men to vote from considerations which have little to do with a love of truth or a sense of justice". In this view, parties feed upon the weaknesses of political man. Robert Michels likewise argued, in his study of the German Social Democratic Party, that party organization becomes an end in itself. Organization means oligarchy, that is, the negation of democracy.²

This universal view of parties as destructive of democracy eventually gave way to an almost equally universal view that parties are indispensable to the operation of democratic institutions. The shift came about mainly as a reaction to the one party systems created in fascist and communist regimes, from which it was surmised that democracy is bound up with the existence of at least two or more parties. The previously despised parties were suddenly elevated to positions of great prestige by political philosophers and students of parties. A.D. Lindsay, R.M. MacIver, Joseph Schumpeter and Maurice Duverger, to name but a few, all laid great stress on the role of parties in the democratic process.

They recognized that it is not sufficient to grant an abstract right of opposition to individuals. To be effective, opposition must be enabled to organize, that is to form a party. In the absence of parties there would be no check on the egoism of the rulers. Also, the masses are given the

opportunity to participate effectively in government only through parties. In advanced societies, concluded Duverger, "liberty and the party system coincide".³

In the last decade or so political parties seem to have fallen once again into disrepute, especially in the "developing" nations. Respected leaders of many countries of Asia and Africa have denounced parties as corrupting influences, "worms upon the body politic". In numerous instances, as in Burma, Turkey, South Korea, Pakistan and Egypt, the ~~A~~Army felt compelled to seize power professedly in order to rescue the state from venal political parties. Even in India, where preparations are now under way for a third general election, disciples of Mahatma Gandhi have urged the conversion of Congress into a national movement and the creation of a "party-less democracy". Nor has the criticism been confined to the non-Western nations. French public opinion turned violently against political parties in 1958, and has remained hostile or at least apathetic ever since. The French case is of exceptional interest, to which we shall return in a moment.

Why are political parties unpopular in many of the countries which have recently started out on the road to modernization? Certainly the friends of democracy have reason to be disturbed by widespread criticism, reflecting a widespread failure, of political parties in the new states.

In fact, parties have been a historical concomitant of modern democracy. It is literally impossible to imagine how democracy could work under modern conditions in the absence of the parties. Demands for a "party-less democracy" are utopian. Parties are the main institutions through which responsibility of the rulers is enforced. If parties are unable to perform this function, then other institutions whose purposes are similar will likewise fail.

One reason for moderate optimism is that the parties now under a pall in the developing nations are not at all comparable to parties in the established democracies. Most Asian parties today are roughly similar to the American parties before 1800 and the British parties before 1867. These were loose associations of deputies whose purpose in banding together was to control parliamentary deliberations and decisions. There was no organization of the voters within a specific structure, little attempt to influence opinion systematically. The first such faction in the British Parliament was known by the initials of its leaders — and "cabal" rapidly became a disreputable word. Party members sought to gain control of parliaments by concerting beforehand and voting as a bloc, not to mention more sordid techniques. The early activities of the First Lord of the Treasury were quite unsavory. The 18th and 19th century parties were widely denounced by contemporaries for their "factionous" spirit. Comments on parties in George Washington's Farewell Address,

for example, are almost indistinguishable from recent statements on the same subject by Pakistani, Burmese, Turkish and South Korean leaders.

It was only when rival factions extended their activities outside of the parliamentary arena and organized the voters, that modern parties came into existence. American parties developed first, because of the rapid extension of popular suffrage and the competition between the Federalists and the Democrats to control the presidency after Washington's retirement. The parties continued to evolve in response to the stimulus of rhythmically timed presidential elections. By 1828, that is, the election of Andrew Jackson, they were full-fledged mass organizations with branches and roots throughout the country. Until the Reform Act of 1832 the English parties were, in Max Weber's phrase, "a collection of notables". Each member of the House of Commons represented, on an average, about 300 voters. When the suffrage was extended the parties immediately established "registration societies" and soon became authentic mass movements.

Viewed in perspective, then, violent attacks on political parties for their venality and egoism are almost to be expected in the developing nations, since similar groupings ("factions" rather than "parties") were likewise criticized everywhere else. Most political parties in Asia and Africa are really cliques of politicians, who make no

attempt to seek support systematically among the masses.

A rare exception is the Congress in India. ^{It is to} ~~It might be~~

~~hoped that,~~ ^{as} the parties grow and to take on a modern aspect, the present criticism will lose its force. However, to consider the current crisis of parties in the new nations as merely "growing pains" might be overly optimistic.

The conversion of Asian, ^{AND LATIN AMERICAN} ~~and~~ African political parties into mass organizations is not simply a technical problem involving such matters as the creation of local branches and publication of party newspapers. Nor does it wait upon the triumph of the principle of universal suffrage. The real difficulty is that an enormous gap exists between a small, educated elite and the illiterate peasant masses. Not only are there few organizational links between the elite and the masses; there is hardly any communication. Literally, they ^{SOMETIMES} ~~do~~ not speak the same language. Some leaders may have a mass following because of their role in the struggle for national liberation. But this kind of loyalty is closer to traditional veneration of the all-knowing chief than to the kind of interaction between leaders and followers characteristic of modern parties. Until all the people become literate and relations between them and their leaders are placed on a more rational basis, it is difficult to see how authentic mass parties can come into being.

Another disquieting tendency in the developing countries is to deny that opposition parties play a constructive role in the political process. The task before the educated

elite seems clear and uncontroversial: to ^{FREE}wrench the peasants ^{FROM THE GRIP OF}~~out of the~~ age-old traditions, ~~of their tribes and villages,~~ release new social energies, and achieve rapid industrialization. Opposition parties are readily identified, frequently with reason, as strongholds of traditionalism and orthodoxy. To those in power criticism appears to be both uninformed and objectively wrong. Under these conditions the temptation is great simply to suppress the opposition and get on with the job.

It can be anticipated that the modernization of a society will lead gradually, after a transitional period of "factionalism" and various setbacks, to the development of modern parties — stable associations seeking to organize and shape the opinions of masses of voters. Prediction of the precise form which these party systems will assume is, of course, risky. The Soviet model of the single, highly centralized party has great appeal (as an organizational type, wholly apart from ideology) to many of the elites in developing countries today. But even if evolution takes place along the lines of western parliamentary democracies, it should be kept in mind that party rivalry may repeat the experience of France and Italy rather than Britain and America. Indeed, in India this is more likely to happen than not. There is a trend towards the development of parties expounding antagonistic ideologies and reflecting divisions of opinion over a number of criss-crossing issues.

It might be worthwhile to consider the essential traits of two and multi-party systems, assuming that a

developing nation will follow a course towards these types rather than a "party-less" ^{or} single-party regime. Any party system in a democracy must perform at least two functions: it must permit major social groups to formulate demands and gain access to the decision-makers; and it must somehow provide for the reconciliation of these demands in the form of enforceable policy. Naturally, there must also be a free flow of communication between the government, the opposition and the electorate. Are there any significant differences between the two and multi-party systems as regards the performance of these functions? Let us compare the experience of France and the United States.

The French party system has been the object of a torrent of abuse from its very inception. Multipartism has become a byword in the United States and Britain for complexity and chaos, a kind of dread disease to be avoided at all costs. A criticism always levelled against a minor party or splinter movement is that it would reduce the country to the ^Asubject condition of France. Recently the chief minister of an Indian state warned that controversies within the Congress Party might lead to the unspeakable evil of "groupism", and to clarify his meaning, he added, "as in France". Foreigners might well be excused for maligning French parties. For years the man who is now President of the Republic has consistently denounced the parties as elements of disunity. The French parties indeed have been unsuccessful in performing their

proper role. Any controversy which might have existed on this score was ended by the collapse (or overthrow) of the Fourth Republic in May, 1958. Nonetheless, it may be suggested that the usual criticism by foreign observers is besides the point if not altogether mistaken and that the genuine difficulties of parties in France are in many ways similar to those of the "developing" nations.

The multi-party system in France appears to be more complicated than in fact it is. British and American observers are frequently misled by assuming that the term "party" refers to the same phenomenon in their countries and France. Major parties in a two party system always consist of coalitions of groups, interests and forces, each of which is more like a French party than is the whole agglomeration. On the other hand, the French parties frequently collaborate — in both election campaigns and cabinet coalitions — in a manner quite similar to the negotiations which take place in any large party of the United States or Britain. The institution of the cabinet crisis under the Third and Fourth Republics, coupled with a multiplicity of parties, gave French politics an air of instability which existed only on a superficial level. Indeed, significant changes in both public policy and public opinion were so rare that many French observers characterized the system as immobile, rather than unstable.⁴

The essential functions of political parties in a democracy are performed just as satisfactorily in the multi-

party system of the French type as in the two party system on the British or American pattern. It should not be forgotten that there are five large parties in Finland, Norway and Denmark and four in Sweden and Iceland, yet all Scandinavian countries are noted for the dynamism and relative stability of their governments. The French system worked remarkably well from the establishment of the Third Republic to the end of World War I. ✓A succession of outstanding leaders were able to establish the Republic on firm foundations, reconstruct the shattered economy, pay off the German reparations, create a system of secular schools, rebuild the Army, and finally fashion a diplomatic coalition bringing about the isolation and defeat of Germany. Perhaps of even greater importance, the system coincided with an unprecedented flowering of artistic, literary and scientific talents. Even the much criticized Fourth Republic presided over an impressive expansion of the economy and introduced significant reforms of the country's social and colonial structures.

It would be fruitless to attempt to appraise institutional arrangements. Defenders of the multi-party system point with pride to the extensive freedom of choice offered the individual voter, while advocates of the two party system emphasize the stability offered by vesting responsibility for governance in the majority party. These alleged advantages do not always materialize. In any case,

a country does not consciously weigh advantages and disadvantages in order to choose one system over the other. Political parties are extraordinarily complex social institutions whose character inevitably is determined by the historical traditions of the society in which they grow.

In France one of these historical factors has been the existence of a highly centralized, extremely efficient administration. Its basic structure was created by the ~~medieval~~ monarchs and was further developed by the Revolutionary leaders and Napoleon Bonaparte. All political parties accepted the administrative system; the supreme question was how to prevent its utilization for partisan purposes. The ^{REPUBLICAN} solution was to keep a close check upon the political heads of the executive by making them continually responsible to Parliament. A rough balance came into being between the executive (cabinet and bureaucracy) and the national sovereignty (expressed through universal suffrage, parties and the Parliament). A cabinet could be overthrown with relative ease by Parliament. But whenever a majority in the Assembly coalesced concerning a particular issue the cabinet had ample power to accomplish whatever was required to achieve the objective. Majorities shifted, however, according to the issues; hence, the cabinet crisis became an indispensable feature of the system since it enabled the legislature to form a series of majorities in order to deal with problems as they arose. The classic parliamentary system in France, which existed from 1875 to 1958 (apart from

the Vichy period), worked better than was realized by most foreign observers.↳

Since 1958 the party situation has been transformed.⊙ there is no longer any need for intricate coalitions or cabinet crises since two parties together have a sizeable majority in the Assembly. The significance of this evolution is greatly reduced by the fact that policy-making power in the Fifth Republic has remained largely in the hands of General de Gaulle. In a sense, power has been transferred from the parties to the President of the Republic. ~~How long this situation can or will last is a matter of conjecture.~~

Although the same functions (reconciliation of interests and points of view) are performed in both two and multi-party systems, the differences in political "style" are considerable. In two party systems each of the major parties includes a great variety of social interests. Much negotiation and compromise takes place within each party.

A comparison of the French and American parties ~~may serve to~~ highlight both the similarities and the differences.

Contrary to the assumptions made by many foreign observers, there are striking differences between the American parties as regards their social composition. The contrast between Democratic and Republican constellations of interests is sharp. It was put in extreme but substantially accurate form by Charles A. Beard, forty five years ago.⁵ The center

of gravity of poverty, he wrote, is in the Democratic Party, and the center of gravity of wealth is in the Republican Party. His observation was correct in 1917, and remains valid today. This is not to say that all poor people are Democrats and that all rich people are Republicans, but rather that there are trends towards one or the other party within major social and economic groupings. In a two-party set-up the contenders are so evenly balanced that a vote of 60 to 40 per cent in favor of one party within any social group or region gives it a decisive edge. In presidential elections a candidate who receives 55 per cent of the vote wins by a landslide; the usual margin of victory is under two per cent. As in all nations, some people vote for a party because of strong regional traditions. However, these irrational factors cancel themselves out in the nation as a whole.

Beard's observation is borne out by even the most cursory glance at election statistics. The Democratic Party is strong in the low-income areas of the great cities. The Republican Party is solidly entrenched in the middle and upper class suburbs. This pattern repeats itself in every industrialized state outside the South, and is becoming increasingly characteristic of that region as well. In New York the Democrats build up two to one margins in the city of New York and some of their upstate strongholds; the Republicans counter with a similar margin in the suburban and rural areas. Organized workers, low income groups

in general, and Negroes tend to vote Democratic; businessmen, middle class and professional people, middle and upper income groups tend to vote Republican. Studies of campaign contributions also reveal that most trade unions contribute to the Democrats, while an overwhelming percentage of corporation executives contribute only to the Republicans (and not to both parties, as popularly believed).

However, the differences between the major rivals in a two party system in terms of program or policy are not as great as might be expected. The Democrats and Republicans sometimes take opposing positions on an issue of historic importance (extension of slavery into the territories in 1860, free silver in 1896, empire in 1900, economic policy in 1932, and so on). But the general tendency is for both parties to drift along in the same direction, because neither party can secure a majority of the votes if appeals are directed only to convinced supporters. Hence, the claims of the ^{MILITANTS} ~~principal~~ supporters of each party must be toned down in the interests of electoral success.

The parties are not and cannot be diametrically opposed; they must accept a certain minimum program corresponding to the wishes of the uncommitted voters. Nonetheless, the bias of each party shows through. The Democrats are far more willing to use the resources of the federal government for social and economic purposes than are the Republicans. The issues between the parties are of degree

rather than of kind. In a multi-party system similar moderation and resolution of claims takes place -- but in parliaments and cabinets. In both cases there is ample opportunity for the expression of diverse viewpoints, yet eventually the political system provides for the formulation of policy on the basis of compromise.

The powerful currents of history affect all political structures whatever their particular arrangements may be. The rise of the working class in industrialized countries led everywhere to heightened ^{POLITICAL} tension throughout the nineteenth century. At the present time, in all party systems of Western Europe, North America and the older Commonwealth countries -- whether of the two or multi-party variety -- there appears to be a trend away from ideological conflict. The area of agreement between parties accepting democratic principles is becoming increasingly large. In France and Italy the parties of the center have collaborated closely in both election campaigns and cabinet coalitions. Although the immediate reason for this collaboration was the need to prevent the extreme Left and Right from paralyzing the Republic, it also expressed a genuine accord among the center parties over policy. Similar developments have taken place in Scandinavian countries in the absence of a grave threat from extremist parties. In Great Britain and the United States, the major parties have come to accept a number of key policies in both the foreign and domestic domains. Alternation of the parties in office does not result in

violent twists or reversals of policy, precisely because of an underlying agreement over fundamentals.

Cooperation among parties has been pushed to a logical and perhaps extreme conclusion in contemporary Austria. Ever since the Liberation the Christian People's Party and the Socialist Party, which together receive 80 to 90 per cent of the total popular vote, have decided before the election to form a coalition government. The two parties agree ahead of time on a division of the ministries between them. The issue before the electorate is the relative importance each party shall have in the cabinet, not which shall be in power or in opposition. At first glance, the system seems absurd. How can a Minister of France who advocates "free enterprise" possibly get along with a Minister of Nationalized Industries who espouses "socialism"? Yet, the mixed cabinets in Austria have somehow managed to work quite well. Two ministers are able to agree more easily on questions of daily administration, or on matters of pragmatic policy, than on larger issues of political philosophy. Politics in Austria merits attention because trends common to all contemporary parliamentary democracies are especially clear there.

The legacies of nineteenth century ideological movements have been gradually toning down the fervor of their appeals and programs. All socialist parties have gone through a period of crisis over the question of the means to be employed in achieving their goals. Advocates of revolution have generally lost out to those who believe in

parliamentary procedure and a reformist program. Nationalization has been abandoned by most socialist parties in favor of planning and the mixed economy. Similarly, most conservative parties have given up the old doctrine of laissez-faire and have accepted (in practice if not in theory) the need for extensive State involvement with the economy. The Austrian experiment in socialist-conservative teamwork is merely a striking illustration of this trend towards the closing of the ideological gap.⁶

A fundamental cause of the decline in ideological controversy is a transformation of social structure which seems to take place in all industrialized societies at a certain stage of their development. Professor Otto Kirchheimer has referred to this as the emergence of a "unified middle class society", which includes the working class, civil servants, white collar workers, and professionals. On the one hand, the old independent artisan and shopkeeper is disappearing. The new middle classes tend to gain their livelihood in some kind of bureaucratic enterprise (whether public or private), within which they have a degree of autonomy. They have lost the independence, or illusion of independence, which in the past gave them a consciousness of superiority to workers. On the other hand, the percentage of national wealth allotted to the working class has vastly increased. Members of the working and middle classes have thus come to experience the same kind of social discipline and to share the same aspirations, values, tastes, dress

and leisure-time habits. They seek a larger portion of the national income in order the better to enjoy a common way of life. Politics thus becomes a matter of slicing up the cake, not debating whether to bake something else. These developments were first evident in the United States. It has been traditional for observers to contrast the "interest-oriented" or "broker" American parties with the "missionary" or "ideological" parties of Europe. It is now apparent that European parties are evolving toward the American model, as the popular masses participate increasingly in the modern sector of the economy.

So far this comparison of party systems has emphasized similarities. But it must also be recognized that there are as well some significant differences involving much more than political "style". The French public, for example, was alienated from the parties in both 1940 and 1958, at the time of the collapse of the Third and Fourth Republics. Was the multi-party system responsible for the unhappy fate suffered by two Republics? Scandinavian experience would suggest that the existence of several major parties is not incompatible with stable democratic government. An explanation is rather to be sought in the quality of the French parties and the nature of the social conflict which they expressed.

Since the ~~Great~~ Revolution of 1789 the major social forces in France have not been in agreement on the institutions through which the nation is to be governed. That is, the French were not able to "agree to disagree". The landed

aristocracy adhered to the principle of hereditary monarchy, while the ~~new~~ middle class and the workers tended to be Republican. The establishment of the Third Republic in 1875 represented a compromise between monarchists and republicans which gradually stabilized itself and won widespread acceptance. Even though the Republic triumphed by the end of the 19th century, the old social and ideological controversies continued to bring into question the forms of the state. The social groups which previously supported monarchy or Bonapartism — notably, the aristocracy, clergy, army officers, significant elements of the peasantry, and part of the middle class — clamored for a stronger executive. On the other hand, the workers and more newly risen elements of the middle class tended to identify the Republic with the dominance of a Parliament elected by universal suffrage. The rough balance in the classic French parliamentary system between executive and Parliament reflected an underlying equilibrium between opposing social forces.

"Immobilisme" in government has been but one of many manifestations of a deeper social immobility. The social structure of France has changed less than that of any other major Western nation in the past two centuries. Since ~~the~~ Revolution of 1789 the population of the United States has increased sixty fold (from 3 to 180 million), that of Great Britain has tripled, while that of France has expanded only about 50 per cent. Furthermore, the industrial revolution has had less of an impact in France than elsewhere in Western

Europe. Thus, the agricultural sector is far more important in France than in Britain or Germany, and the industrial sector proportionally less important. In political terms this means that the new social forces generated by industrialization in advanced states (managerial cadres, skilled workers, technicians, engineers, and scientists) play a reduced role in France, while the traditional social formations (such as the peasants^{RY}, small shopkeepers, landed aristocracy, family business groups, unskilled workers) retain much of their old political power. It also means that classic ideological controversies — involving, for example, the form and activities of the State, and the position of the Church — tend to have a longer life in France than in other western nations.

However, sweeping changes have been taking place in French economic and social structure in the past ten years. It is possible that many of the historic orientations of both regions and groups will be utterly transformed as a result. Since 1949 France has been undergoing an impressive economic expansion, comparable in her history to the boom during the reign of Napoleon III. In certain key sectors of the economy — railroads, aviation, electricity, chemicals, automobiles — technological progress has approximated or surpassed that of Western Germany and the United States. Between 1949 and 1959 annual production of electric energy doubled; production of aluminum tripled; production of steel

went from 9.1 million to 15.2 million tons; production of tractors from 17,000 to 78,000; the number of housing units from 51,000 to 320,000, and production of automobiles from 286,000 to 1,283,000!

Widespread use of modern household devices and ownership of private automobiles and scooters are changing shopping and living habits. The rapidity with which the "Quick Lunch" has caught on in France attests to a major revolution in progress. The tempo of life is shifting from a Mediterranean to a Northern pattern, or more accurately, from a "traditional" to a "modern" pace. Work incentives and leisure time aspirations are increasingly similar to those of people in the more advanced industrial states.

Many observers of the French political scene — Gaullists in particular — have hailed these developments as presaging an inevitable transformation of French political life. They reason that the newly created or expanded social categories — technicians, managers, economists, scientists, engineers, rural elites making use of modern techniques, white collar workers — are no longer interested in the old, sterile ideological quarrels. The hope has been expressed that political parties will respond by becoming more pragmatic, that is, by proposing practical solutions to pressing problems without regard to ideology. Losses suffered by the Communist Party in the election of 1958 were considered, by these observers, the beginning of a "dis-intoxication" of the working class with militant Marxism.

In the long run, the remarkable industrial expansion being experienced by the French is bound to bring with it changes in political parties and opinions. But so far there have been few signs of such change. The most ideologically oriented party in France -- the Communists -- recovered most of their electoral support in the municipal elections of 1959. Public opinion in the latter part of 1959 was aroused to fever pitch by the hoary issue of State aid to religious schools. The traditional political parties have not freed themselves of concern with doctrinal and ideological disputes, nor have they been successful in recruiting the elite of the new social groups. It appears that total domination of policy making by the President of the Republic has undercut or partially paralyzed the parties. Perhaps only after the parliamentary institutions of the nation are revived will the process of modernization include the parties and public opinion as well as the economy and the social structure.

The impact of industrialization on the political process is thus not confined to the so-called developing nations today. Relations between social forces and political parties as a consequence of technological progress can and should be studied comparatively in both modern and traditional societies. Among the western nations, France's experience in this domain most closely resembles that of India. In both countries there has been remarkable stability of the social structure over a considerable period of time, coupled

with an ideological system justifying traditional attitudes towards life. Spirituality and craftsmanship have long been exalted, economic drive and "materialism" rejected or ridiculed. In both countries, too, industrialization took place against the grudging opposition of large social groups wedded to orthodoxy of one kind or another. In France as in India, the stresses and strains of the conflict between the parties of "order" and "movement" (to use the terms popularized by François Goguel in his study of parties under the Third Republic) have seriously weakened social consensus concerning institutions. A powerful Communist movement has developed in both countries -- always a sure sign of uneven economic development, alienation of the working class from the rest of society, and weak traditions of political compromise. The values of a modern, secular state are openly repudiated by reactionaries as well as revolutionaries. Above all, both countries are now engaged in a determined effort to modernize, which is bound to affect the political orientation of social groups and ~~political~~ parties in the long run.

It is unnecessary to add, as a word of caution, that France and India are unique and that comparison of political trends which ignores their special history and character would be misleading. Yet, our understanding of each nation, and of the general process of modernization, would be heightened by identifying differences and similarities in their political development and attempting to elucidate them.

II. PARTIES

1. Recent works on British and French pressure groups include: Samuel E. Finer, Anonymous Empire (1958); J.B. Stewart, British Pressure Groups (1958); Henry Ehrmann, editor, Interest Groups on Four Continents (1958); and Jean Meynaud, Les Groupes de Pression en France (1958). See also my articles on "Pressure Politics in France", Journal of Politics, November 1956; "Alcohol and Politics in France", Am. Pol. Sci. R., December 1957; and "Religious Schools and Politics in France", Midwest Journal of Political Science, Spring 1958.

2. See James Bryce's preface to M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties (1902), and Robert Michels, Political Parties (1914).

3. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1954), pp. 424-25. Other works referred to in the text include: A.^D. Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State (1943); Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (1947); and Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1947).

4. For a fuller development see Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity (Homewood, Ill., 1960), especially chapter one.

5. Beard's thesis has been taken up again recently by Clinton Rossiter in his fine study, Parties and Politics in America (1960).

6. This argument is further developed in the excellent study by Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," Social Research, Summer 1957 (reproduced in Comparative Politics, op. cit., pp. 216-27). It must be added that this trend is evident only in the older, established democracies. Ideological controversy is rife in the "developing" nations.

III. EXECUTIVES

Modern democracy developed out of the successful efforts of representative assemblies in circumscribing and then taming the arbitrary power of irresponsible executives. In England the triumph of Parliament over the monarch, particularly as regards the power of taxation and the raising of armies, was achieved in the seventeenth century. In America the Revolution was waged by a Continental Congress against the executive agents of a foreign nation; after victory power was vested by the Articles of Confederation in a national Congress to which the executive was completely subordinated, practically to the point of extinction. Throughout the continent of Europe, especially in the period following the French Revolution, representative assemblies gradually whittled down the royal prerogative. But in the contemporary era, the trend has been decisively reversed -- power has been flowing away from parliaments and back to executives.

Of course, the theory of legislative supremacy is proclaimed by all representative democracies. The Constitution of the United States declares, in Article I, that the "legislative power is vested in a Congress" and then spells out an impressive list of powers specifically placed within the competence of Congress. French constitutions customarily state that the national sovereignty expresses itself through parliament, on the basis of universal suffrage. In Britain the pleasant fiction is maintained that laws are passed by

"the Queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the consent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons."

Even the Constitution of the USSR refers to the Supreme Soviet as the "highest organ of State power" — though that body meets approximately ten days a year and has never been known to cast anything but a unanimous voice vote. In fact, all legislatures, including those in the democratic states, have declined in importance with respect to the executive. The rise and predominance of the executive appears to be a leading characteristic of modern political organization.

It is perhaps misleading to introduce the example of totalitarian regimes, since by definition parliaments "decline" (to the zero point) whenever a dictator comes to power and rise again if the dictator is overthrown and replaced by a more liberal government (as in Italy, Germany and Japan after 1945). The Russian Duma was of some importance during the years preceding World War I, but parliamentary bodies ceased to wield power after the forcible dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January, 1918, on orders from Lenin, by the celebrated regiment of Latvian Sharpshooters. Let us therefore omit from consideration the non-democratic systems, whether communist, fascist or traditionally autocratic. Even so, the decline of parliament has been unmistakable in the established Western democracies — for example, Great Britain, the United States and France.

In the 19th century parliament played an important

and creative role in the British, American and French political processes. In his classic study, The English Constitution, Walter Bagehot described a system in which a rough balance existed between Parliament and the cabinet. Leadership was provided by the cabinet, while Parliament was expected to criticize, evaluate and judge. Bagehot viewed Parliament as "the great engine of popular instruction and political controversy ... the best means yet known for arousing, enlivening and leading a people." Each branch had a powerful weapon at its disposal: in the event of disagreement the cabinet could dissolve the House of Commons and call for fresh elections; on the other hand Parliament could vote no confidence in the cabinet, compelling it to resign. Parliament was not supposed to govern. It was rather to determine who should govern and then to provide a public forum wherein the actions of government could be debated, and repudiated or upheld. Writing in the same period, John Stuart Mill was quite certain that these were the "proper functions" of a representative body.

Throughout the 19th century in the United States there was also a rough balance between the legislature and the executive, generally in favor of the former. Each branch had some power to defend itself from encroachment by the other; though Congress could not deny confidence to the President, the latter could not dissolve Congress and call for new elections. But Congress voted laws, levied taxes, raised

armies, declared war, regulated inter-state commerce, and gave consent to treaties and executive appointments while the President could veto legislation, send messages to Congress, propose legislation, conduct foreign affairs, execute the laws, and act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The exact balance between the Congress and the President depended upon a number of factors, such as the personalities involved, the particular issues between them, the state of public opinion, and whether they were of the same party. Strong presidents — like Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln — gave a firm lead to Congress and used their powers boldly. Under weaker presidents, or in quiet times, the system reverted (as in the title of Woodrow Wilson's book) to "congressional government."

The 19th century was a period of legislative supremacy in France (under the Republic) and other continental states. Popular interests were identified with parliaments and were supposed to express themselves exclusively through that agency. After Marshal Macmahon dissolved the Chamber of Deputies in 1877 in an unsuccessful bid to pave the way for the restoration of monarchy, the Left identified dissolution and an independent executive with reaction. Parliament made and unmade cabinets at will, usually in response to an underlying shift in party alignments on a particular issue, sometimes merely to assert its supreme control over the executive.

How different is the situation today! In Britain the old balance between Commons and Cabinet has been upset. The House of Commons does not determine who shall govern, since the choice for all practical purposes is made between the leaders of the rival parties by the electorate. Parliament has also virtually lost the power to vote no confidence or to reject cabinet proposals since the ruling party is supported by its members, who constitute a majority in the Commons. The final vote reflects the proportional strength of the parties in Parliament. Few votes are changed, few arguments are intended to win over the opposition. Quite naturally public interest in parliamentary debates has diminished. In effect, a large part of Parliament's former power has been devolved upon both the Cabinet and the parties.

The loss of parliamentary power has not been quite so marked in the United States, but the same general trend is evident. The president has gained more ground than the Congress, though the latter continues to enjoy considerable prerogatives. Increasingly legislation stems from proposals submitted by the President at the beginning of the session, in and subsequent to his message on the State of the Union. It is expected by both majority and minority alike that the Administration will take the initiative. Congressional energies are then devoted to debate on the "Program of the President". Congress reserves the right to modify or reject

these proposals, but the driving force behind the system as a whole is clearly the presidency.

To discharge these new responsibilities the President is aided by a personal administrative staff which has assumed significant political power. All of the powers enjoyed by the President under the Constitution -- military, diplomatic, legislative, and executive -- have expanded and reinforced each other. The Presidency is the focal point at which all lines of opinion, interest and power intersect. It should be stressed again, however, that Congress retains a great measure of independence. It cannot be dissolved, prorogued or controlled constitutionally by the President. If the Congress is opposed to the President and accurately reflects public opinion (a crucial consideration), the President can never have his way. Nevertheless, the American system may be characterized today as "presidential government".

The most striking evolution in relations between the legislature and the executive has occurred in France. Throughout the Third and Fourth Republics cabinets were utterly dependent on coalition agreements among a number of parties for their continued tenure in office. During periods of military or economic crisis the Parliament was readily persuaded to grant sweeping powers to a cabinet. The practice of vesting "decree powers" in the cabinet indicated that a shift towards the executive was taking place even though the forms of parliamentary supremacy were maintained.

But in general the French parliament was in a favorable position with respect to the cabinet -- until 1958.

In line with the ideas of General de Gaulle and Michel Debre, the constitution of the Fifth Republic has drastically reduced the power and position of the Parliament. It is now limited to two ordinary sessions a year, for a total of less than six months. Law-making power is confined to regulations concerning matters specifically listed in the Constitution. On all other matters the government may legislate by decree. The government also draws up the agenda, thus determining the order of business for Parliament. Only six committees are allowed, to prevent any encroachment upon the cabinet's prerogatives. The Constitution provides also for an "executive budget", which may be adopted (under ^{PROCEDURE} ~~complicated provisions~~) even if Parliament refuses its approval. Although the Cabinet remains responsible to the National Assembly, its position is strengthened by a number of constitutional provisions. A motion of censure, for example, may be passed only if an absolute majority of the Deputies vote for it -- that is, abstentions count for the government. Under certain conditions the text of a bill may become law unless a motion of censure is passed by an absolute majority.

Above all, the Constitution has greatly expanded the powers of the President of the Republic. In effect, it has created a chief of state whose authority derives

neither directly from Parliament nor from the electorate, and who is able to function as a "national arbiter". In General de Gaulle's view, he incarnates the superior interests of the nation and disposes of independent power in the event of an emergency. He may dissolve Parliament, submit referenda to the people, and assure the regular functioning of the government. He is the "guarantor" of national independence. In practice, the trend ever since General de Gaulle's inauguration in January, 1959 has been towards concentration of power in the hands of the President. He presides over important meetings of the Council of Ministers, announces major policy decisions, and has virtually taken over direction of foreign, military and Algerian policy. The French system differs radically from the American in a number of ways: the French president is elected indirectly, there is a division of constitutional power between the president and the cabinet, and there is no effective counterbalance from either an independent parliament or a federal system. If anything, the French system today is closer to "personal" than to "presidential" government.

Thus, executives everywhere have moved to the center of the political stage, regardless of constitutional and party structure. Whether in parliamentary or congressional systems, the voters are called upon to choose essentially between continuation, replacement or modification of the existing administration. This choice involves personalities,

representation of interests and questions of general confidence, as well as issues. In other words, under modern conditions the electorate accords a broad authorization to govern, rarely any specific mandate.

In totalitarian systems, of course, parliaments have been obliterated. In the developing nations of Asia, Africa and the Middle East it would be misleading to speak of a decline. Their parliamentary institutions have not yet taken root (with a few honorable exceptions); that is, the position has not yet been reached from which it is possible to decline. The rise of executives at the expense of legislatures throughout the world symbolizes a basic transformation of social and political structure. Executives are on the ascendancy because they are better able than legislatures to adapt themselves to the requirements of modern conditions.

One development favoring the executive was the growth of mass political parties which organized the electorate. The American presidency was the first major executive agency to be transformed by popular election. It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the choice should be made by a small number of presidential electors in each State. Immediately after Washington's retirement, however, the electoral college was radically changed, not in theory but in practice. Prospective

electors pledged themselves to support a party ticket, and the voters in each state decided which slate of electors would occupy these offices. The trend culminated in the triumph of Andrew Jackson in 1828. Through this device the president became an instrument — the prime instrument — of democracy. An immense force welled up within the presidency precisely because its occupant was the only national leader deriving his authority from votes of all the people. The groundwork was laid for the future expansion of presidential power.

A similar trend asserted itself in Britain, notably after the Reform Act of 1867. Increasingly the party battle was fought outside of Parliament, with the voters determining which leader should become prime minister by supporting one party or another. The House of Commons came more and more to resemble the American electoral college — a unique, even quaint device for counting popular votes. In both countries the representative assembly could not pretend to be the sole agent of popular sovereignty. The national will in reality is expressed more accurately in the choice of a chief executive than in the election of representatives from single member districts, keeping in mind the vagaries and distortions of the latter process. By comparison, the absence of popular plebiscitary elections in France placed the executive (both the president of the Republic and the prime minister) at a disadvantage with respect to Parliament. A French general election determined how much representation

each party would have in the Chamber; it did not designate the prime minister or the president. One of the curious features of the 1958 Constitution is that the President is elected indirectly by an electoral college consisting of about 80,000 persons, mainly municipal and departmental councillors. Most of the members of the electoral college which chose General de Gaulle in 1958 were themselves elected in 1953. General de Gaulle's legitimacy derives not from an election, but from history — his role in the Liberation and after. It is significant that leading members of the governing party in France have recently proposed direct election of the president.

A parallel development strengthening the executive was the changing nature of political issues. In the heyday of parliamentary supremacy, the great issues were purely or mainly political — qualifications upon suffrage and Irish Home Rule in Britain, extension of slavery into the western territories in the United States, the nature of the republican regime in France, and so on. Silver-tongued orators took up the challenge of these issues, spun out fine arguments, and swayed votes in the process. All these questions involved principles, and furthermore could be resolved by a general legislative act. It was decided either to admit free and slave states into the American Union, or to grant self-government to Ireland, or to maintain the French Republic — and that was the end of it.

But a new kind of question cropped up by the turn of the century — relating to factory inspection, social security, regulation of industry and highly technical fiscal policy. These complicated matters required a good deal of technical knowledge for an understanding of the issues involved, not to mention an intelligent decision. It was also necessary to establish some kind of agency to administer the will of Parliament in continuing fashion. A vote did not settle much in itself. Furthermore, the technique of a debate between partisan adversaries is not a very satisfactory way of dealing with social and economic problems. Perhaps some matters of principle must be decided, for example, whether or not there shall be any state intervention in the economy at all. Beyond that point partisan rivalry may seem irrelevant to the public. On the other hand the chief executive does not have to debate with himself in public, he has access to a mass of information provided by the civil service and he can claim to be acting for the national interest on the basis of rational or expert considerations.

The increasing complexity of modern economic life demands state intervention in order to keep the complicated mechanism in operation. A legislature simply is not equipped to mediate rapidly between aggrieved parties. It would all too readily get itself bogged down in partisan brawls. Inevitably the executive rather than the legislature is in a position to do what the people expect. Thus, parties

have legitimized the executive by giving it a popular base. At the same time parties grievously weakened representative assemblies because the unseemly scramble for votes and favors by the members, and the debating technique instinctively used by party antagonists, are basically not suited to the resolution of complex economic and social problems. The great ^{ORATORIAL} ~~debating~~ traditions in all parliaments have given way to analytic reports and disciplined party voting.

Executives have also been favored by the increasing need for quick action in emergencies in order to maintain the safety of the nation from external attack. Legislatures are not appropriate forums for discussion of military tactics and strategy. Some decisions must be taken on the basis of confidential information concerning the enemy's capabilities, and it is usually not considered advisable to give too many hints to the other side concerning one's own intentions. The instability of the international state system in the modern era had led inexorably to enhanced importance of the military, and consequently also of the branch of government best able to direct the military. Power accumulated by the executive in this area has added to its powers in all other regards.

The need for unity and despatch in the conduct of war is probably the single most important reason for the break-through and rise of presidential power in the American

constitutional system. It is stated in the Constitution simply that the President is "commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States." This clause had been more or less overlooked until Confederate forces fired upon Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor, in April 1861. A special session of Congress was to meet on July 4. In the celebrated "eleven weeks" before Congress convened, Abraham Lincoln produced a spectacular display of presidential power. He read the commander-in-chief clause, coupled it with his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed", and concluded that the war power (at least under conditions of a civil war) belonged to him. He asserted the claim in a series of unprecedented actions: on his own authority he announced a blockade of Southern ports, seized rail and telegraph lines between Washington and Baltimore (and later all the way to Boston), suspended the writ of habeas corpus along these lines of communication, and summoned 75,000 (later 300,000) volunteers to defend the Capitol. The Constitution specifically reserves to Congress the power to raise armies. Lincoln's call for volunteers had no coercive force behind it. Not a single man was obliged by law to answer this presidential summons. Yet, within a week, down came the men of the North: that prince of regiments, the Sixth Massachusetts; then the Seventh New York, Sproule's Rhode Islanders, the First Michigan Volunteers, and all the rest. Within a month an army of volunteers wheeled into

line along the Potomac. The President had correctly interpreted the profound wish of the nation that the Union be preserved, and the war power gravitated to him.

The enormous expansion of presidential power in the Civil War may be illustrated by the events leading up to the Emancipation Proclamation. Until 1861 Lincoln always argued that while the federal government had both the power and the duty to prevent the extension of slavery into the territories, it had no power to affect that institution in the states where it already existed. Of course, he considered slavery a moral wrong and was convinced that the States themselves would in the long run abolish it. But after a few months of war Lincoln confided to some members of his cabinet that the war was going badly, the forces of insurrection were so widespread and well organized they threatened the very existence of the Union, and so he decided to alter the nature of the conflict by playing "a last card." In a mere presidential proclamation he declared the slaves in certain areas to be "forever free". Lincoln was convinced that, as commander-in-chief during war time, he unquestionably could do things beyond the competence of the entire federal government (President, Congress and Supreme Court combined) under normal circumstances. These precedents had consequences far transcending the war emergency. Lincoln led the people to expect initiative and direction from the Presidency in periods of danger to the Republic. In effect he made the Presidency the focal

point of crisis.

These factors — the growth of parties, the need for rational action in the public interest, the urgency of despatch in military and foreign affairs — have resulted in the shift of leadership to executives in all modern democracies. Legislation is inspired by the executive, budgets are drawn up by the executive, state direction of the economy is assured by the executive, and foreign policy is formulated by the executive.

There has also been a second tendency, complementary to the first: power has shifted within the executive from political heads to professional civil servants. Political executives find themselves in about the same position of inferiority with respect to civil servants as the legislators vis-à-vis the executive branch as a whole. Enormously complicated social and economic problems are beyond the competence of amateurs, whether of the legislative or ministerial variety. Modern governments carry on a wide range of activities: they own and operate industries, run airlines, supervise banks, regulate labor conditions, provide for social security and welfare, as well as maintain internal order and provide for the defense of the state. It is humanly impossible for any one individual to be familiar with the problems of each area. Specialization is an inescapable feature of modern life.

Government is not unique in this respect. In all

modern societies function is the major source of power — rather than ownership or heredity. Policy is made by those who know the secret of the mechanism. The stockholders of large corporations do not really control the enterprises which nominally they own; management is assured by a board of directors, which in turn is greatly influenced by the administrative hierarchy of the corporation. Members of trade unions likewise find it difficult to control the functioning of their own organization. Wherever large numbers of people are involved in the operation of an enterprise — be it corporation, trade union, church, political party, army, university, or the state itself — those who are in charge of daily administration tend to accumulate awe-inspiring knowledge, surround themselves with mystery, and assume operational control.

The state is no exception to this general rule of modern social and economic organization. In traditional democratic theory, the legislature takes the initiative in drawing up bills, the legislature and the political executive collaborate in law-making, and the executive is responsible for administration. In practice, the professional civil service has assumed a key role in each of these stages of the policy process: it ascertains the need for legislation on the basis of experience in administering existing law; it gathers information which is then presented to legislative committees; it helps guide the proposed legislation through parliament, and then administers the law as a matter of course.

Theoretically, the civil service is merely the instrument of policy — which is decided by both parliament and the political executive. Usually, however, parliaments, ministers and presidents alike are overwhelmed by the complexities of their tasks. Political chiefs are forced to rely on advice, indeed they welcome advice, and in the long run are subdued more often than not by the impersonal administrative process. Policy making within the ^{POLITICAL} executive has itself become bureaucratized — through the formation of cabinet secretariats, presidential staffs and central planning commissions.

These trends raise serious questions concerning the future of democratic government. A fundamental principle of democracy is that those who make important decisions should be responsible to the people, at least through elections.

But if policy-making passes largely into the hands of professional civil servants, how can popular control be assured? Should the trend continue, will there be any difference between democratic and dictatorial regimes — or will they all be run by technocrats who manipulate public opinion rather than respond to it?

It might be imagined that the best way to preserve democracy is to reverse the trend here described, that is to reduce the power of the bureaucracy, and vindicate the supremacy of parliament over the executive. Under modern conditions this is virtually impossible. The nature of an

industrial economy requires an expansion of bureaucratic and executive power; to stop this movement would involve reversion to a simpler and more traditional society. Actually, the pressing need in most democracies today is to strengthen the executive. A democracy is more likely to fail because its executive is weak or faltering than for any other reason — if the experience of Italy in 1922, Germany in 1933 and France in 1958 is any guide. A political system must produce ~~competent and~~ dynamic executive leadership, or else it will lose the respect and support of its people.

Even assuming the continued expansion of state responsibilities, it might still be possible to breathe new life into representative bodies. In spite of all the attacks against parliaments, their function of criticism and control are vital in a democracy. It would be desirable to release members of parliament somehow from utter dependence upon the party whip, provided that the autonomy and integrity of the executive were not thereby threatened. The American system of separation of powers offers a distinct advantage on this score since modification of administration proposals, and even adverse votes, do not bring down the executive or trigger new elections. The problem in the United States is to prevent undue interference with the operations of the executive by a ferociously independent legislature, while in European democracies there is some need to stimulate freer thought in parliaments controlled by party whips.

In any case, there is no ~~adequate~~ substitute for vigorous parliamentary debate and criticism. The dread uniformity and errors of dictatorial regimes should be sufficiently convincing on this point.

There have been significant attempts in recent years to introduce checks within the bureaucracy. It has been recognized that nationalized industries in particular must be accorded autonomy if they are to be run efficiently, and that external controls provided by existing parliamentary and ministerial machinery are and will remain inadequate. Thus, efforts have been made to bring the public directly into the administrative process by creating new channels between the people and the State. Experiments have taken place with advisory councils, workers consultative committees, and consumers councils. Unfortunately, early hopes have not been fulfilled. The consumers have been apathetic and the managers have taken care to defend their prerogatives from all threats — including workers councils. In truth, it appears that effective control of the bureaucracy cannot be secured by any institutions now in existence in the large modern democracies.

The dangers posed by an uncontrolled or inadequately controlled bureaucracy cannot be wholly eliminated, but they might be reduced. First, the bureaucracy is not a monolithic bloc. Disagreements arising within and between departments frequently give the political chief an opportunity to exercise his judgment by supporting one set of experts

against another. Above all, the bureaucracy itself is a social structure and measures can be taken to ensure that this miniature society is representative of the great society. A rough kind of parliamentarism can be introduced into the civil service through an authentically democratic recruitment policy. To put it another way, a policy-making class within the civil service drawn exclusively from a single social category will tend to reflect only the ethic or viewpoint of that one class. But if its membership includes men and women having a variety of backgrounds, there will be "built-in" checks and balances. It would be helpful, too, if fresh recruits could be brought in from the outside — business, trade unions, universities, and so on — for short periods of time (say, the period between general elections). The effect would be to invigorate the civil service and prevent the development of a "caste" mentality. Recruitment of the higher civil service exclusively on the basis of competitive exams administered to young university graduates (and who customarily come from the upper social classes), makes it extraordinarily difficult to create a bureaucracy representative of society as a whole.

There is thus a dual "problem of the executive" in all modern democracies: to rationalize and strengthen the executive so that it may meet its responsibilities, but also to devise external controls and internal checks in order

to prevent abuses. It is relatively easy to create an effective executive in societies where there is already a large consensus concerning political institutions, that is, when all social classes and political forces are willing to trust their opponents with this added power. In societies riven by ideological strife, where the national consensus over political institutions is fragile, the "problem of the executive" is ^{EXTREMELY DIFFICULT} ~~virtually impossible~~ to resolve. Attempts to reinforce the executive under the French Fourth Republic failed ultimately because there was insufficient popular support for a coherent majority. A vicious circle comes into being: deep social conflict prevents strengthening of the executive, while weak executives are unable to introduce the reforms and enact the programs which alone can reduce social tensions. The crisis of the executive thus reflects the crisis of society.¹

In the developing nations the commitment to modernization can be carried out only by modern executive. The task requires a large number of educated, competent, and dedicated civil servants along with an imaginative and dynamic political leadership. Frequently, trained civil servants are in short supply, or they may have received a training more suitable to ancient China and Victorian England than the contemporary world. The parties may be little more than cliques of office-seekers. When executives and parties fail it is the turn of some other force to fill the breach. In many of the developing nations today, that force is the army.

III. EXECUTIVES

1. This thesis is expounded convincingly by Jean Meynaud, "The Executive in the Modern State", International Social Science Bulletin, vol. X, no. 2(1958) - reproduced in Comparative Politics, op. cit., pp. 342-64. The entire section on political institutions, ibid, pp. 297-425, may be of interest to the reader, and contains a select bibliography as well. In this lecture I have followed the general outlines of Meynaud's article, though with a different emphasis.

IV. THE ARMED FORCES

Armies are very much in the news these days. A short time ago the Brazilian army refused to permit the vice-president to succeed to all the powers of the presidential office. There was an unsuccessful uprising by the South Vietnamese army in Saigon, and a successful one by the South Korean army in Seoul. An imposing list may be drawn up of nations where the military has seized or attempted to seize power in the past ten years. In the Middle East and Asia, going from West to East, the list would include Egypt, the Sudan, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea. In many other countries the military exerts considerable political influence. Armed coups take place regularly in Latin America. There is also the example of the French army intervening in politics for the first time in over a century. Students of comparative government have devoted much attention in the past to such traditional topics as constitutions, parties and public administration. Surely it is appropriate to use the same kind of comparative method in studying political power, and the force which now bulks large in the rivalry for power — the army.

In theory the army in all states, whether democratic or not, is considered an instrument of national policy. It is for the state to determine policy, and the army's duty is to carry it out successfully. The supremacy of civilian authority is a basic principle of democratic government.

Political issues are referred ultimately to the electorate, not to the army. Overthrow of a duly elected government by the army is the ~~very~~ negation of parliamentary democracy. In authoritarian regimes, too, the role of the army is to implement directives, not make them. This follows from the very nature of modern military organization. The generals are presumed to have specialized knowledge and competence; they are not expected to be trained diplomats or economists. Even ~~in the heyday of Prussian militarism~~ Bismarck was always careful to maintain this distinction.

However, the theory of civilian supremacy is difficult to apply in specific situations, especially during wartime. Where does policy begin and where does implementation end? If the military leaders are convinced that a certain course of action will undermine national security, is their loyalty to the "misguided" civilians or to some higher authority? In war should the military shape foreign and economic policy in order to gain its minimum strategic objectives? In peacetime, to what extent is the military entitled to determine the size of its own budget? No country has escaped controversy between civilian and military leaders over these ^{DIFFICULT} ~~aggravating~~ questions. The bitter feelings between Lloyd George and Lord Haig during World War I, the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman in 1951, the French Army's insurrection in April, 1961 - indicate the existence of the problem in the established democracies. The role of the ^AArmy is even more difficult to define in

non-democratic regimes, as demonstrated by Ludendorff's dictatorship in World War I or Stalin's purge of the officer corps in 1937.

The question of obedience to the state on the part of military leaders poses a thorny ethical problem. Consider a few specific cases. From 1938 to 1944 members of the German General Staff plotted continually to assassinate Adolf Hitler and seize power. The one attempt which finally came off, in July 1944, was unsuccessful. Is it clear that these men were in the wrong, that obedience to the dictator should have taken precedence over their own view of German interests? In 1937 leaders of the Red Army were accused of conspiring to overthrow the regime. The purge which followed affected 3 out of 5 marshals, 13 out of 15 army commanders, 57 out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195 divisional commanders, and 220 out of 406 brigade commanders.¹ It is quite possible that Marshal Tukhachevsky and others were indeed preparing a move against the regime. But if Mr. Khrushchev's recent statements concerning Stalin are at all accurate, it is a pity that the scheme imputed to Tukhachevsky did not succeed. It should also be remembered that a certain brigadier general in the French Army refused to accept the armistice signed by his legally constituted government in 1940 and carried on the war from abroad. Even though sentenced to death in absentia for treason, General de Gaulle's esteem among his countrymen did not seem to suffer unduly.

Obedience by the military merges into the general problem of obedience to the state and the role of individual conscience. Without questioning the importance of this philosophical issue, it might be useful to consider the matter in another fashion -- by comparing the conditions under which military intervention in politics takes place. One of these conditions is obviously the existence of an oppressive dictatorship. Since there is no way of overthrowing the dictator peacefully, that is, by means of fair and free elections, the temptation is very great to resort to force. But military intervention in politics has also occurred in France -- one of the mainstays of parliamentary democracy in Western Europe. Thus, the armed forces have felt compelled to enter the political arena in a variety of circumstances.

In some instances the military action has been relatively mild. The Burmese Army was virtually asked to rule for a brief period, "cleanse" the parties, and then turn power back to the civilians. In Brazil the military chiefs were content to exercise a veto over the powers of the president and did not take over themselves. But in numerous cases -- for example, Turkey, South Korea, Egypt and Pakistan -- the military has acted with surprising violence. The recent execution of former ministers by a Turkish tribunal attests to the bitter feelings on the part of the military towards their former civilian chiefs.

It might be useful, for comparative purposes, to consider three nations or groups of nations where military intervention in politics is important: Latin America, France and the new nations of the Middle East and Asia. The case of the French army is especially interesting since it concerns an advanced democratic country.

Latin America is customarily considered the home of political militarism. The chief use of a Latin American army is not to fight a foreign foe. Geographical isolation and the shield of American naval power has kept the South American continent insulated from the shock of modern war. Armies in this part of the world have long devoted major attention to politics. For ^{MANY} ~~a variety of~~ reasons — going back to the traditions of the Spanish conquistadores — the caudillo was a dominant figure throughout Latin America during the 19th century. The "man on horseback" rode in and out of presidential palaces with depressing regularity. However, there has been a decided trend away from militarism in the 20th century. It is not generally realized abroad how far Latin American countries have departed from the romantic tradition of caudillismo.

One observer has concluded, in a recent survey, that armed forces continue to play a dominant political role in seven small, economically backward Latin American Republics. The total population of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras and Panama

is little over 13 million. In six Republics it appears that the armed forces are now politically neutral, and these countries account for one third of Latin America's population. The most important of these nations is Mexico; the group also includes Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Costa Rica. The armies in the remaining republics are in various stages of transition toward political neutrality. "The inescapable historical conclusion", states Edwin Lieuwen, "is that, although there have been short-term cyclical undulations in the pattern of military as opposed to civilian rule, the long-term secular trend is away from the former and is moving toward civilian government". The case of Mexico is striking. As Lieuwen observes: "A quarter century ago no Latin American army was more political than the Mexican; today the armed forces are virtually out of politics. Mexico has moved from one extreme to another".²

Thus, Latin American experience seems to go counter to the more general tendency elsewhere in the world and therefore offers a check for comparative analysis. It must be remembered above all that the historical experience of Latin America has been quite different from that of the "new" states in Africa and Asia. The latter were generally under foreign rule, gained independence after a national liberation struggle, then frequently adopted the liberal institutions of the former colonial power. Failure of the attempt to achieve a viable liberal democracy paved the way

for intervention by the armed forces. In Latin America the process was reversed. Following military and oppressive rule by the Spaniards there was military and oppressive rule by caudillos. The excesses of militarism led responsible citizens to work for civilian supremacy.

In this task they were helped by the growth of Latin America's economy. Industrialization brought into being new social classes who aspired to a more rational political order than that provided by desultory military raids upon the treasury. The armed forces themselves developed a more professional orientation. European and American armies were widely emulated and this meant inevitably a greater concern with expertise than political maneuvers. The combination of popular revulsion against long traditions of militarism, growing modernization of social and economic structure, and a more professional attitude on the part of the officer corps seems to have resulted in a genuine reinforcement of civilian authority in most Latin American countries. The clear tendency among the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, on the other hand, is in the direction of greater political activity on the part of armed forces. However, the nature of political militarism varies considerably from country to country.

In a society going through the agony of transition to more modern forms of organization, the military may be a major support for either the traditional or the modernizing

forces. If allied with the traditional ruling class, the military has the classic function of keeping the masses in line. In other cases officers overthrow the traditional elite and seize power in order to spearhead a national movement of renovation and modernization. Hence there are several types of military intervention in politics: replacement of one traditional chief by another — which involves no modification of the existing system; overthrow of a liberal regime or suppression of popular uprisings in support of a traditional leader — the Army thus playing a reactionary role; overthrow of either a traditional regime or of a weak, ~~corrupt~~ liberal regime in order to start the nation on the road to modernization. Social and political structures are transformed, the masses are aroused, the system is never the same again. This third type of intervention — for example, Ataturk in Turkey, or more recently, Nasser in Egypt — is the most significant. It occurs when the army is in advance of the other public powers as a rationalizing or modernizing force.

The trend toward rationality is characteristic of all social groups in a modern society, including the military. Indeed, elucidation of personnel and management principles took place first in the armed forces; only later were they applied to the civil service as a whole. Recruitment according to professional qualifications rather than political influence or wealth was introduced in Prussia by the celebrated decree of 1808, which lays the groundwork for modern military

establishments. It provided that: "The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception."³ Involvement of the mass of the people in military operations after the French Revolution accelerated the movement towards bureaucratization. An army could not longer be addressed on the eve of battle by a commander on horseback. Effective coordination of the actions of hundreds of thousands of men required a chain of command, a distinction between line and staff functions, recruitment of talent regardless of class origins, and advanced educational institutions concerned with military science. By the end of the 19th century all the major powers had begun to reorganize their armed forces along rational rather than traditional lines.

In one respect, however, the military lagged behind civilian society. Emphasis on discipline and individual courage sometimes delayed the application of technological advances to warfare. Military establishments often were tradition-bound hierarchies which had continually to be prodded into new ways by the civilians. Clemenceau's celebrated dictum — that war is too important to be left to the generals — may be supported by numerous examples of wars fought with outmoded ideas and weapons. But at the present time the military is adjusting rapidly to technological innovations, and in the process is becoming perhaps more appreciative of both science and technology than the civilians.

Weapons development programs everywhere are leading to a reorientation of military thinking. A situation may come about in a developing nation where the army is a more supply instrument of modernization than the civilian departments. This is especially the case where the ideal held up for civil servants is the classically educated humanist. Thus, it may happen that the army rather than the civil service embodies the qualities of dynamism, empiricism and "know-how." Political militarism in these circumstances may mean that a modern army seeks to raise a traditional society to its level.

But no single factor by itself can account for the degree of political consciousness on the part of military leaders. The growth of military professionalism in one country leads to political neutrality, while in another country it culminates in a seizure of power. Corruption on the part of the civilians may be tolerated or shared by one army, and indignantly stamped out by another. Modernizing forces may be strongly opposed by the officers in one nation, just as strongly supported in another. The causes as well as the character of military intervention in politics are quite varied.

Before attempting any generalization it would be useful to examine at greater length recent developments in France. In May, 1958 the French Army participated actively in a coup d' état for the first time since the overthrow

of the Second Republic. If anything, the Army went further in 1958 than during the events engineered by Louis Napoleon. On December 2, 1851 the generals carried out the orders of their legal commander-in-chief, the President of the Republic, only after considerable hesitation. The Army took no initiative in the plot and gladly embraced political neutrality again under the Second Empire. But in 1958 elements within the Army helped create a revolutionary situation; the generals disregarded the instructions of the President of the Republic, joined a Committee of Public Safety, issued a political ultimatum to the government in Paris, and drew up plans for an invasion of the metropolis.

After General de Gaulle's accession to power, the army continued to exercise extensive administrative and political powers in Algeria. In January, 1960 barricades went up in Algiers, in protest against the policies of General de Gaulle. During one eventful week, the army refused to use force in order to remove the barricades, even after a murderous exchange of fire had taken place. The generals carried out their duties only after receiving a direct order from the Chief of State, coupled with sweeping political concessions to the army in Algeria (for example, the assurance that the army would organize any referendum and protect the peace). But resentment among the officers was widespread. In April, 1961 a portion of the army -- led by Generals Challe, Zeller, Jouhaud and Salan -- proclaimed

a rebellion, seized control of large areas of Algeria, and threatened military action against Metropolitan France. The attempted coup did not succeed, largely because of the determination of President de Gaulle, the opposition of public opinion, and splits within the armed forces. A number of insurgent officers have escaped the authorities and now head a secret army organization whose goal is to overthrow the existing regime. The score for the insurgent military officers is one success (May, 1958), one partial success (January, 1960) and one failure (April, 1961). But the game is not yet over.⁴

The Army's tradition of political neutrality thus has been abandoned. For over a century the Army accepted changes of regimes and of governments, considering itself an instrument of policy. Contrary to all the postulates of civilian supremacy and military professionalism, the army became politicized. Why?

The French army has been subjected to a series of profound shocks since the outbreak of World War II. The defeat of 1940 and De Gaulle's decision to continue the war from London confronted every Army officer with a political choice. Obedience to Pétain or De Gaulle — or Dentz, Catroux, Darlan, Giraud — necessarily involved non-military considerations. These wartime divisions weakened the army greatly, for even after victory the quarrels were continued. Furthermore, De Gaulle established a dangerous precedent:

he appealed from the regime to the nation and was showered with honors as a result. Other generals were later tempted to follow his example.

Even more important, however, has been the formulation of a theory of revolutionary warfare by a number of influential French army officers, based upon their experiences in North Africa and Indo-China. The result has been a preoccupation with guerilla warfare, reorganization of the army, and finally, the development of a political consciousness on the part of many military leaders — culminating in two definite attempts to overthrow the regime.

In the current French view the nature of modern warfare has undergone a profound change. On the one side, there is the invention of weapons of mass destruction; on the other, the resort to guerillas. Both developments have rendered obsolete classic strategy and tactics based on conventional arms. While the over-all balance between the Great Powers is maintained by terror, the actual fighting is being carried on by revolutionary means. The enemy first creates a political and military organization which establishes itself in selected regions. It collects taxes, administers justice, represses opposition and then recruits and supplies rebel bands. To win over the population, they use the seductive slogan of independence. Once the region is secure, the rebel army then "swims like a fish among the people". Even if defeated in battle, the guerillas simply

slip back into the population, regroup forces, and fight again. In order to beat the rebels at their own game, the French officers concluded it was necessary not only to destroy the rebel apparatus but to win over the local population. They called for "psychological warfare". In effect, the army ~~officers~~ proposed to take over the techniques of the revolutionaries, place them at the service of different goals, and mobilize the superior power of the French nation for that purpose.

The French army has applied this theory of psychological warfare in Algeria. A major effort has been made to loosen the rebel grip over the population. The army has sought to regroup and above all organize the Algerian masses. Over a million Moslems have been evacuated from "insecure" areas and resettled under the direct supervision of the army. A network of new army-sponsored associations (labor, youth, sports, and social) covers the country. Special administrative agencies have been established by the army throughout Algeria to perform a wide variety of tasks, ranging from education to sanitation and administration of justice. To combat the rebel slogan of independence, the army spreads the gospel of "integration" — a vague term whose exact meaning changes frequently. By 1958 the army had assumed vast administrative powers over Algeria, which gradually became incompatible with a role of strict political neutrality. The generals were convinced that in case of a conflict between military and civilian administrators in

Algeria, the last word should rest with those who were more familiar with local problems, that is, themselves. A number of army officers then concluded that the campaign to win over the minds of the Algerian masses could succeed only if "defeatist" elements in France were silenced. The traditional roles of army and state were thus neatly reversed: it was now the duty of the army to define goals and obligations for the nation.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the merits of this theory of revolutionary warfare. It is exceedingly doubtful that political movements can be reduced merely to manipulation of the masses by elite groups. Whether or not the Algerian people will be attracted by the ideal of national independence or of integration with France cannot be decided exclusively by propaganda techniques. The important point for our purposes is that the French army gradually developed an ideology (whether valid or not) which justified its intervention in politics. Leading army officers were glad to believe that their setbacks were due to the blunders of politicians at home rather than to troops in the field. They concluded that the army was the proper custodian of national ideals and even had a duty to renovate the state. When it was made to appear that the politicians were going to negotiate with the rebels, in May, 1958 and in April, 1961, important elements within the army were readily persuaded to act in defense of their conception of the national interest.

The French experience points up some of the difficulties of generalizing in the area of civil-military relations. We assume usually that weakness or vacillation on the part of the civilian authorities will tempt the military to fill the policy or power "vacuum". This in fact frequently occurs. When terrorism broke out in the city of Algiers in January, 1957 the civilian administrators were unable to cope with the situation, and virtually turned their powers over to General Massu. To take another of many examples, during the struggle for succession which followed upon the death of Stalin, divisions within the ruling group permitted the army to influence events. The army's support enabled the opponents of Lavrenti Beria to disarm the security police in 1953. Later, Marshal Zhukov came out in favor of Mr. Khrushchev after the latter had been outvoted in the Party's Presidium. As soon as Mr. Khrushchev won undisputed control of the party organization (as registered in the celebrated 1957 meeting of the Central Committee), he made haste to eliminate Marshal Zhukov from membership in both the Presidium and the Central Committee. The army thus played a political role only during the period of party disunity.

However, in France the army intervened in politics in opposition to a particular policy, not because of the weakness of civilian authorities. The Fourth Republic had many faults, and one was the confusion frequently resulting from cabinet crises and party realignments.

Those weaknesses were supposedly eliminated by the Fifth Republic, which in practice concentrates power in the hands of the Chief of State. But the army attempted a revolt against the "strong" state in 1961. Actually, the army ^{was} ~~has been~~ determined ~~ever since 1958~~ to reject any policy envisaging independence for Algeria, whether that policy emanated from a weak coalition cabinet or a strong president.

Thus, the significant condition for military intervention in French politics has been the growing alienation of the army from both the nation and the state. This alienation derives in part from the experience of colonial wars, during which army commanders became accustomed to the exercise of extensive administrative powers. They began to despise the politicians — who quarrelled among themselves and lacked a sense of purpose — while the military got things done. It became natural after a while for the generals to claim all successes and to blame the defeats upon Paris. A psychological gap widened between the civilian governments in France and the commanders in the field.

Lack of understanding between the army and the state reflects a pervasive disagreement within French society as a whole concerning political institutions. The major social forces have been quarrelling over the regime ever since the Revolution of 1789. Workers, capitalists, small businessmen, the church hierarchy, peasants, army

officers, and the nobility have never been wholly satisfied with the "rules of the game". The strongest trade union in France, the General Confederation of Labor, is controlled by Communists. Workers thus in great numbers support a union and a party which reject the system. The parliamentary regime is also distrusted by many groups on the Right. Whenever one group or political force gains a temporary advantage, there is a temptation to change the rules of the game for their own advantage. The reflexes of distrust and suspicion pervade the political process, and are kept in check mainly by a strong sense of nationalism. In practice the major social forces and political parties accept the Republican regime provisionally, but compromise is frequently difficult to achieve. The army's theory of psychological warfare in a sense parallels the revolutionary ideology of a portion of the working class and the reactionary ideology of some groups on the Right -- in all cases the central theme is alienation from the state.

It is hardly surprising that political issues should sometimes separate civilians and officers. In every major power of the modern world there have been occasions when military leaders were pitted against their civilian chiefs. In the United States, for example, there were celebrated clashes between General McClellan and President Lincoln, and General MacArthur and President Truman. In Great Britain during the period 1914-18 civil-military relations were marked by mutual distrust and power rivalry. The deep split within the nation over Home Rule for Ireland was reflected

in the notorious Curragh incident in March, 1914. General Gough and fifty seven officers at the Curragh camp resigned their commissions rather than agree to take part in operations against Ulster. The government then claimed that there had been a misunderstanding, that no operations were contemplated and hence no resignations were called for. However, the British army obviously was not a reliable instrument of the cabinet's political policy.

Even more serious was the lack of confidence between the politicians and the generals during the latter part of the war, culminating in Lloyd George's move against General Robertson in February, 1918. In his memoirs, Lloyd George later expressed his conviction that a number of generals at the time sought to overthrow his war cabinet and "enthroned a Government which would be practically the nominee and menial of this military party."⁵ He greatly feared a military dictatorship, with General Robertson and Field Marshal Haig playing the role of Ludendorff and Hindenburg. The fears were doubtless exaggerated, but may not have been altogether groundless.

However, the American and British political systems so far have been able to surmount these crises and maintain the principle of civilian supremacy. In both countries the armed forces in the final analysis respected the constitutionally prescribed limits upon their power. General McClellan did not march on Washington at the head of loyal

troops; instead he contested the election of 1864 as Democratic candidate for president against Lincoln. General MacArthur confined his reaction to speechmaking. General Robertson and Marshal Haig accepted Lloyd George's reorganization of the high command. The armed forces thus acted very much like any other major political group in the nation; they sought to press their claims, but only within the system.

Perhaps the most fruitful kind of comparative analysis is to consider armies as social groups. Their members are recruited from the various social classes which make up the nation. They develop certain conceptions concerning their military role, relations with other groups or corps, and the nature of state institutions. The ideology of the armed forces will tend to take on the general character of group conflict in a particular society. In modern societies, assumption of a distinctly political attitude by the military is likely to occur where the main social groups have a long history of mutual antagonisms, the institutions of the state are insecurely established, and habits of compromise are weak. In the developing countries the main question is where the army stands in the rivalry between traditional and modernizing forces. Study of the army thus leads the investigator to the wider "group universe", and ultimately to the "political system".

IV. THE ARMED FORCES

1. Figures given by G.H.N. Seton-Watson, in Michael Howard, editor, Soldiers and Governments (1957), p. 112.

2. Quotes are from Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (1960), pp. 171 and 101. I have relied mainly on this book for the above analysis of Latin American militarism.

3. Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (1957), pp. 30-31. The discussion of modern trends in the military is based largely on Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: the Military Establishment," Administrative Science Quarterly (March, 1959), 473-93. See also the comments by Ralph Braibanti in Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (1961), pp. 173-76.

4. For more detail on military intervention in French politics since 1958, see R.C. Macridis and B.E. Brown, The De Gaulle Republic, op. cit., and also B.E. Brown, "The Army and Politics in France," Journal of Politics, May 1961.

5. Quotation from D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs (1936), vol. V, p. 2786. See also Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917-18 (1956), pp. 53-58; and Robert Blake, "Great Britain," in Michael Howard, op. cit., pp. 45-48. On the Curragh incident: Harold Nicolson, King George the Fifth (1952), pp. 237-39.

V. POLITICS: "WEST" AND "NON-WEST"

Students of comparative politics have traditionally been preoccupied almost entirely with institutions and processes in Europe and North America. Edward Freeman, John Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot, Woodrow Wilson, Harold J. Laski and countless others have compared the American presidential, British parliamentary, and continental systems. Standard controversies concerned the power of dissolution, two and multi-party systems, fusion of powers versus separation of powers, federal and unitary structures, and the contrasts between democratic and totalitarian regimes. Little attention was paid to other regions of the world, except by those interested in colonial administration. The great strength of comparative politics during this period was the relative homogeneity of the nations under study. Western Europe and North America share a fundamental complex of values, outlooks and technology.

The field of comparative politics has been drastically affected by the extension of inquiry into Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Traditional questions and problems now seem almost irrelevant, or trivial. A comparison of the political process in Great Britain and the United States in terms of their institutions is of some utility because in fact the two cultures are fairly similar. Comparison of Great Britain and Ghana in the same terms would be misleading. It is rather necessary to examine such matters as the extent of literacy, class differences, urbanization, the level of

economic and technological development, and the degree of national unity. Renewed emphasis on the relationship between political and social structure has in turn invigorated the entire discipline of comparative politics.

The achievement of independence by peoples who had been brought under the domination of European states in the past is one of the most important historical developments of our time. It is comparable to the liquidation of feudalism, the 18th century revolutions in America and France, the industrialization of Europe and North America, the extension of European influence in the world, the Communist seizure of power in Russia, and the development of modern science. All of these events had a great impact on intellectual and artistic activity, as well as on theories of politics. The resurgence of the formerly subjugated peoples of Asia and Africa has resulted in a shift in the balance of world power and calls for a new focus of interest in the study of comparative politics.

No terminology has yet won general acceptance in comparing politics of the older and "newer" nations. Some writers have applied the adjective "backward" to the former colonial areas, but this has unfortunate and unwarranted implications. Many of these peoples boast distinguished cultural achievements which frequently antedate those of the so-called "advanced" nations. The term "underdeveloped" is only slightly less objectionable; "developing" is much

better. "Non-Western" is widely used to designate nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America in various stages of reaction to western ideas and techniques. There are some drawbacks to this neat contrast between West and Non-West. The United States is geographically to the east of Japan, yet is a "western" nation. Is the Soviet Union the East compared to Asia, or the easternmost extension of the West? Reference to the "new" nations fails to do justice to Latin America. However, the terms "developing," "non-West," and "new" will be used here indiscriminately, on the understanding that none are wholly satisfactory.

Are there any significant differences between the "Western" and the "non-Western" political processes? If so, what are they? A group of political scientists with special interest in Asian studies have suggested, in the hope of providing "helpful hypotheses for guiding the researcher", that there are a number of distinctive characteristics of the political process in non-Western countries. These include a high rate of recruitment of new elements into the political system (masses of people for the first time are taking an interest and are participating in politics); lack of consensus about the legitimate forms and purposes of political activity (widespread disagreement over the legitimacy of the State); prevalence of charismatic leaders; a low degree of integration in political action by the citizens (that is, little relationship between every day concerns of peasants and the policies of leaders); a vague

and undefined "role structure" (that is, individuals may have many roles, for example, army officers and scholars may become rulers and administrators); a rudimentary organization of interest groups; and expression of political claims in a sudden, erratic and often violent manner.¹

The drawback of such a list is that many of these characteristics appear to be "distinctive" of the political process in the West as well. That there are charismatic leaders in Ghana, India, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Guinea and so on is undeniable -- though not every African and Asian state is so blessed. But are not Adenauer, De Gaulle, Kennedy, Macmillan and Khrushchev also dynamic and forceful personalities? A lack of consensus concerning the state is, alas, all too evident in France and Italy, as are occasional manifestations of violence by such groups as the peasantry.

Nor is it entirely unknown that army officers become rulers in the West. There are unquestionably great differences between the West and the non-West -- but they cannot be summed up adequately in this fashion.

Instead of deducing a catalogue of characteristics from existing political systems, it would be more useful for analytic purposes to distinguish between two "ideal-types" or "models" of societies: the traditional and the modern. There is no intention in using these terms to imply any relationship of inferiority or superiority regarding individuals or cultures. A traditional society may include

a large number of highly educated persons whose level of culture and social grace is higher than that of the mass of inhabitants of any modern society. Furthermore, these terms refer only to abstract "constructs"; they do not describe any existing societies. For example, the United States is a predominantly modern society, but one with many traditionally oriented groups in its population.

The distinction here suggested is a familiar one in social science literature. Similar definitions have been put forth by such noted theorists as Sir Henry Maine, Ferdinand Tönnies, and especially Max Weber. Essential to all these classifications is a contrast between the simple and the complex, "status and contract," immemorial custom and rationality. Weber, for example, distinguished three types of claims to legitimacy: traditional-established belief in the sanctity of traditions and of those exercising authority under them; charismatic-devotion to an individual based on exceptional personal qualities; and rational-belief in legality and obedience only to institutions rather than persons. There is a clear implication in Weber's scheme that the three types correspond to historical development from simple to more complex societies. A people will break out of its traditional or primitive condition usually under the leadership of a charismatic chief whose power, as the society becomes more advanced, devolves upon legal institutions.²

In both traditional and modern societies the individual is a member of groups and associations, but there are marked differences in their nature and importance. The economy in a traditional society is agricultural, and more or less self-sufficient. Virtually the entire population is engaged in agriculture, hunting or fishing in order to provide their sustenance. There is no knowledge of technology or science, no accumulation of food reserves, little cultural or artistic activity. The dominant social organization is the family and family type groups ("primary" organizations whose members are in a "face to face" relationship). An individual's status in society is determined by his family's status. He is fed, educated, nurtured by the family, and usually finds his life work within the family.

Family values permeate the whole society, with the emphasis on the qualities of devotion, respect, courage and reverence. Personal relations are influenced greatly by non-rational values and ideologies, such as witchcraft and taboos. Custom regulates the actions of the population in minute detail. Man lives close to nature, even as a part of nature. He sees his life inextricably confounded with the stars, the seasons or external events over which he has no control.

The state tends to be a vast prolongation of the family. Chiefs and elders are obeyed in the same way and for the same reasons as fathers. Legitimacy of the leaders, like paternal authority, derives from a superhuman or divine

source. Insofar as the chief needs help in interpreting the tribal customs or administering his will, he relies on a "household". The governing class in traditional societies is sharply set off from the rest of the population, its position buttressed by myths of divinity and sacredness. In practice a political community is created by conquest. "Politics" is the endless rivalry of families and clans for economic and military domination. As the economy develops, the dominant class may intensify its exploitation of the rest of the population. It is characteristic for government in such societies to be viewed exclusively as a coercive device for the exploitation of the laboring peasantry. Frequently a distinction is established between the beloved monarch and the hated tax collector. It is exceedingly difficult to rule large areas from any one central point in traditional societies. Local rule is usually vested by the paramount chief in some loyal supporters or clans. Relationship between regions or areas are therefore feudal; they are dependent on the degree of personal devotion inspired by the dominant leader.

The contrast between traditional and modern societies is complete in every respect. In a "model" modern society the individual gains his livelihood in a factory, office or enterprise. The family tends to take on the character of a specialized association; it ceases to be the principal circle within which the individual lives. In modern societies there is a proliferation of secondary

organizations, that is, large, specialized and impersonal associations like corporations, labor unions, recreation groups, political parties, churches and universities. Members of these organizations need not be in a "face to face" relationship and rarely are in a position to know all of their fellow members. The act of joining the association is voluntary and the purpose is highly specialized. Most of the functions of the traditional family are taken over by the new associations: education by schools, charity by the church or state, provision of a livelihood by the business firm, exchange of produce by a banking system, and so on.

The modern state resembles a secondary organization rather than a family. It is large, complex, impersonal, and rational. The civil service recruits able men from all strata of society on the basis of competitive examinations. A system of fixed tenure, grade classifications and increments replaces the old practice of nepotism. In the realm of values and thought-patterns, the preoccupation with magic, astrology and religion yields to science and reason. Religious worship continues, but no longer dominates all social activity. Men investigate the mysteries of life and the universe rather than adjust to them. Political legitimacy derives not from divine right but from a more ^{SECULAR} ~~rational~~ concept of popular sovereignty.

Perhaps the crucial difference between the traditional

and the modern societies is that the latter have all developed a technology. Historically, there have been an enormous variety of types within the general category of "traditional" societies, ranging from the subsistence agricultural and pastoral societies of Africa, to the military states of ancient Egypt, the land empires of Asia Minor and China, the island civilization of the Aegean, Ancient Greece and Rome, and the feudal states of Europe. Many of these societies produced a remarkably high culture and developed extensive political controls and administrative systems. Accumulation of produce and realization of profits led to the creation of a merchant class, the growth of cities, and the development of the arts. But these societies were not able to sustain regular increases in economic growth through the application of technology. Rationalization of political authority, development of secondary associations, and secularization of culture go hand in hand with industrialization. The major nations of Europe and North America moved into the modern era in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries. Essentially, the peoples of the rest of the world are now following suit, though at a greatly unequal pace. Most of the "non-Western" nations are no longer traditional, but are not yet modern. They may best be understood as in transition.

Towards what goals are these nations "in transition"? A "modern" form of society is quite compatible with a variety

of political systems. Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and the liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America all have or had industrial economies. The trend toward modernization could theoretically be patterned after ~~any~~ ^{EITHER THE DEMOCRATIC OR TOTALITARIAN} ~~of these~~ models. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion in the discussion which follows, the meaning here given to "democracy" and "totalitarianism" should be made clear.

Underlying all democratic theory is a denial of the existence of any single truth in the governance of men. It is postulated that knowledge is limited, that those in power may be wrong, that all will benefit from discussion and criticism. As a corollary, democracy assumes that each man deserves to be respected as a person. The irreducible dignity of the individual makes society ever more diverse than the organized state. The community is thus accorded the right to reward or punish its temporary rulers because it is too complex to be grasped by general laws, too elusive to be comprehended by bureaucratic regulations. Democracy in effect shields the inner life of the community from the necessarily brusque actions of government. The state is a tool of the greater society; the ultimate meaning of democracy is that (in Henry Thoreau's phrase) men should not become the "tools of their tools."

The distinctiveness of democracy is that the people can choose and change their government. Democracy cannot

function in the absence of basic civil liberties — particularly those relating to speech and the press — which enable the community to vindicate itself against the state. Furthermore, the right to criticize, if it is to be effective, must include the right to organize opposition through political parties. Representative democracy is essentially procedural. It is characterized by free expression, free parties, and free elections.

This emphasis on procedure is rejected by the anti-democratic critics as irrelevant, if not nefarious. Legitimacy for them derives from some other source — the nation or class or race. It can never be brought into question or put to a vote. Parliamentarism, said Karl Marx, means that the people have only the right to decide which members of the ruling class shall have the privilege of exploiting them for the next few years. The masses are thus given the illusion of power, while the capitalists enjoy its substance. Fascist theorists have likewise contended that parliamentary democracy is only a front for plutocracy and that the majority in any case is incapable of governing.

All non-democratic regimes, whether autocratic or totalitarian, reject democratic assumptions concerning the value of criticism and the uses of representative institutions. In contrast to traditional autocracies, a modern totalitarian state secures the participation of the masses (not just the palace circles) in some great endeavor.

Totalitarian states are always in movement, since inaction permits the opposition to rally. Coercion and terror are used against opponents, but the legitimacy of the regime in the long run depends upon popular identification with the goals of the leadership. Communist regimes present the masses with a vision of some future society where exploitation of man by man is ended, productive labor becomes a pleasure instead of a burden, and the creative energies of the people are released. Fascist governments also seek to win popular acceptance, mainly by appealing to nationalist feeling. Adolf Hitler denounced the inequities of the Versailles Treaty, ended unemployment through a scheme of public works and rearmament, restored Germany's position as a world power, and then attempted to bring about European unity through conquest. Whatever the views of the rest of the world, these aims were considered proper by the vast majority of the German people. Communist regimes are also becoming increasingly concerned with purely nationalistic interests.

It must be stressed that between the two models of democracy and totalitarianism there is a wide variety of intermediate positions. Some states in Latin America are moving perceptibly from autocracy (not totalitarianism) to parliamentary democracy; in some instances the movement is in the reverse direction. Important differences also exist among both fascist and communist nations. Fascism in Hitler's Germany was more dynamic and dangerous than

in Mussolini's Italy or Franco's Spain. Communism in China, Russia, Poland and Yugoslavia exhibits marked differences in ideological tone, power structure, degree of "movement," and use of terror. In some ways Hitler and Stalin were more alike than either Hitler and Mussolini or Stalin and Lenin. These variations should not lead us to obscure the basic contrast, however, between democracy and totalitarianism.

To return to the central theme of our discussion, towards which of these "models of modernity" — mass democracy or mass totalitarianism — are the transitional nations moving? Are social conditions developing which might provide the basis for viable parliamentary institutions? It might be instructive to compare the political attitudes and prospects of the various leadership groups in the non-Western world.

A number of elites in the new countries — like orthodox priests, army officers, and the hereditary aristocracy whose wealth and power is based on land — are sometimes opposed not only to the establishment of democratic institutions but even to the introduction of modern technology and ideas. Although these forces are condemned to ultimate defeat, they may be in a position to slow down or postpone the movement toward modernization. Everywhere power is slipping out of the hands of the traditionally oriented

leaders because they are unable to retain the allegiance of the people.

Many political leaders in the new nations believe in parliamentary democracy and are striving earnestly towards that goal. For the sake of convenience we may call them the "liberals". They have fashioned the institutions of their nations after those of the Western democracies. In the former colonies of Great Britain, for example, the essential elements of the British parliamentary system have been taken over and adapted to local circumstances. A ^{CHIEF} ~~head~~ of state with honorific functions designates a prime minister, who heads a cabinet and is invested by and is responsible to a Parliament. Features of the American presidential system have been copied in Latin America, the Philippines and Vietnam, and French influence is seen in the administrative and political structures of her former colonies. The "liberals" advocate political reforms which will gradually reduce the power of the landed aristocracy, devolve political responsibilities upon the people, and introduce modern economic practices. They encourage private investment, try to attract foreign capital, and combine these with a rough blueprint for economic expansion — occasionally dignified as a "Plan".

The "liberals" are in deep trouble throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. Their economic policy does not generally result in rapid industrialization. It tends

rather to stimulate uneven development, with emphasis on consumers goods and foreign imports, and accompanied by glaring examples of social injustice. The masses are reluctant to accept the discipline required by modern production methods, which leads to social unrest.

These difficulties have resulted in a growing conviction that "Western" democracy is not suitable for developing societies. Frequently the goal of parliamentary democracy is still accepted, coupled with a denial that it can be achieved in economically underdeveloped nations by liberal methods. A distinction is drawn between "formal" or "procedural" democracy (characterized by a two or multi-party system, rights for the opposition, periodic elections) and "genuine" or "substantive" democracy (economic development, modernization, equal opportunity for all, moral regeneration, and the like). It is denied in particular that an active opposition plays a constructive role. Emphasis is therefore placed on "guided" democracy or "basic" democracy or "personalism" or some other formula — that is, on leadership of the masses by a dedicated elite. Sometimes the hope is expressed that the people at some future date will be ready for Western style democracy. This future date, however, becomes more and more remote.

Exaltation of a superior brand of democracy usually masks a desire to suppress the real thing. But it should be recognized that in fact there are genuine difficulties in

transferring parliamentary institutions to the developing nations. Democracy involves more than the existence of a particular political structure. Both the American and British systems of government could easily evolve into dictatorships of the executive in the absence of an organized opposition, free elections, a free press, and deeply rooted traditions of individual rights. Democracy can work only when the values associated with it (particularly those relating to speech and opposition) are fully understood and accepted by all the people. This in turn is dependent upon a whole cluster of social conditions. Literacy, education and enjoyment of wealth must be fairly widespread if the mass of the people are to be in any position to judge and criticize the actions of their governors. In a classic analysis of the social conditions of representative government, John Stuart Mill argued:

A people may be unwilling or unable to fulfil the duties which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be unable to practice the forbearance which it demands ... In such a case, a civilized government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a considerable degree despotic; to be one over which they do not themselves exercise control, and which imposes a great amount of forcible restraint upon their actions.³

Here is the nub of the matter. Men who are literate and informed are certainly capable of understanding their own interests. Under these circumstances, as Mill contended, representative government is the ideally best form. But if the masses are poor, illiterate, immersed in their orthodox

religious ideologies, completely out of touch with the modern world, and if the elite is polished and educated (frequently at the London School, the Sorbonne, or Harvard) then what is the sense of representative government? Must the educated do the bidding of the ignorant? Are science and technology to be judged according to literal observations in epic literature? It is understandable that perfectly decent men should recoil from this reasoning and seek inspiration in political theories and structures which clearly arrogate the power to govern to those capable of governing. Whether men can remain decent when wielding such absolute power is another question.

The authoritarian tradition is as old as political philosophy itself, and Plato's Republic is still the greatest defense of guardianship ever written. But young men in a hurry have no time to read Plato these days. The theory considered by many leaders or aspiring leaders in the developing nations to be most relevant to their needs is Leninism. Obviously, proletarian socialism can hardly be taken seriously in societies where there is little industry and no working class. What counts is the theory of organization and for this purpose fascism is equally useful even though its values and goals are different. Lenin is more influential than Mussolini and Hitler because he was a more acute thinker, and also because the latter went down to defeat. But it should not be forgotten that

fascism was much admired throughout Latin America and Asia before 1945 for its dynamism and drive. The career of Subhas Chandra Bose is a good illustration.

Lenin's theory concerning the relationship between leaders and followers parallels in a striking manner contemporary political doctrine in the developing nations, exception always being made for ideological content. Lenin expounded his ideas during a controversy with more moderate Russian Socialists who wanted to create a labor party in the Western democratic tradition (with leadership elected by and responsible to members). The workers, Lenin warned, if left to themselves would not develop a political or revolutionary consciousness. They would formulate "petty trade union" demands concerning conditions of labor, wages and so on. (There is a flat contradiction between Marx and Lenin on this point, but let us not ~~to~~ enter into the dark world of Marxist deviationism). It was therefore necessary for intellectuals who understood the real needs of the working class to "bring from the outside" knowledge which the workers could never acquire by daily factory experience. Democracy within the party organization is a "useless and harmful toy", which only perpetuates the "primitiveness" of proletarian impulses. The fundamental task is to plan, engineer and carry out the Revolution without giving in to the particularistic demands of the workers whose support, however, is indispensable.⁴

Essentially the same analysis is made by many intellectuals and political leaders in transitional societies today. The mass of the people, if left to themselves, would like nothing better than to continue in their age-old ways -- laboring in the fields and living in all respects like their ancestors since time immemorial. The function of the intellectual is to "bring from the outside" (in Lenin's pungent phrase) knowledge which the illiterate peasantry could not possibly acquire on its own. The task is to wrench the masses out of their traditional way of life and create a modern, industrialized nation with their support and if necessary without their understanding. The illiterate masses are peasants, not workers; the intellectuals are dedicated to modernization, not socialism; but the point in both cases is to devise an organizational structure enabling the intellectuals to direct the masses toward goals desired by the former, against the will but presumably for the benefit of the latter.

The solution achieved by Lenin was the monolithic party whose members are organized in such a way that they implement decisions of the leaders without influencing them. Intellectuals make up the hard core of the party's directing group, and they select themselves and each other on the basis of "professional" criteria. The party wins the adherence of the masses by carrying out propaganda work,

stimulating their political consciousness, demonstrating to them the inadequacy of their primitive demands, and finally recruiting them into the organization. Once fitted into the party's structure, members are forbidden to form "factions" or to organize opposition to the leadership. The party then becomes an admirable instrument, first for the seizure of power, and then for coordination of all social and economic activity throughout the nation. One great virtue of this approach is that it establishes strict social discipline, particularly among the workers, through a combination of coercion and persuasion. The relevance of this organizational theory to the problems of traditional societies has not escaped the attention of politicians and intellectuals in the new nations. An educated elite determines to drive forward to rapid economic and social modernization. It creates a single party or similar bloc and arouses the political consciousness of the masses; this is relatively easy in nations having experienced a national independence struggle. Debate and criticism seem to be irrelevant since the course of action is clearly marked out. The masses have to be set to work at the immense job of modernization. Their role is to implement, coordinate, obey — not to criticize and obstruct.

It need hardly be pointed out that the risks and hazards are enormous. There is no check on the egoism of the rulers, no protection for either the people or even the

original ideals of the Revolution. "It is time to discuss the theses of the Opposition with rifles", exclaimed Lenin after coming to power — and the "opposition" soon included the very people who had made the Revolution. The horror of Stalin's rule underscores the danger of vesting supreme power in an irresponsible elite. It is hardly likely that similar results can be avoided in other nations trying out the same recipe.

It would be rash indeed to attempt to predict the future political evolution of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The trend in recent years has been towards authoritarianism of both the conservative and radical variety, but it may not be irreversible. If India, for example, can achieve modernization through parliamentary democracy, the precedent may be followed by others. It is also possible that economic ^{ADVANCE} ~~modernization~~ may bring about a measure of liberalization in totalitarian regimes. The policies pursued by Stalin do not seem entirely appropriate in present-day Russia.

Even in those nations where representative institutions are unable to work effectively — because of mass illiteracy, the fragmentation of parties, lack of trained administrators, or absence of libertarian traditions — it might still be possible to avoid the disastrous slide into totalitarianism. Leaders who tolerate criticism, respect an independent judiciary, and refrain from the temptation

to regiment the masses may at least keep open a future option in favor of democracy. There is a difference between a holding operation and an assault. Turkey, to cite one instance, was guided from theocracy to secularism under an authoritarian leader, culminating after World War II in the establishment of a parliamentary regime. Ataturk's example indicates that in traditionally oriented nations a dose of authoritarian rule may, under certain conditions, prepare the way for a more modern and democratic form of government.

le
l.e
l.e

But the dilemma is again illuminated by recent events in Turkey. It is exceedingly difficult to build up democratic traditions in an authoritarian manner. The essence of democracy is constant, probing and responsible criticism on the part of social groups enjoying genuine independence from the State. How can social independence develop when the State asserts the right to undisputed primacy? Yet how can society be modernized except through State leadership? As in the case of most great issues of political philosophy, there is no specific solution. All depends on the choices made and the traditions which evolve in a given historical situation.

In any event, the social structures and backgrounds of the developing nations are so different from those of Europe and North America that some modification of democratic institutions is inevitable. Study of this transformation,

and of the interaction between economic, social and political factors in the "non-Western" world is one of the most urgent and challenging tasks of contemporary political science.

V. POLITICS: "WEST" AND "NON-WEST"

1. George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries", Am. Pol. Sci. R., December 1955. Reproduced in Comparative Politics, op. cit., pp. 94-101.

2. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1947), p. 328. Especially useful are the following: Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria-Toward a Typology of Public Administration", in W.J. Siffin, editor, Toward a Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Ind., 1957), pp. 23-116; and the introductory chapter in The Politics of Developing Areas, edited by Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, 1961). Also, Robert M. MacIver, The Modern State (1926).

3. John Stuart Mill, On Representative Government (1861), chap. 1.

4. See V.I. Lenin, What is to Be Done. On the early conflict between Lenin and the moderates within the Russian Social Democratic Party: E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution (1951); and Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (1948). For the organization and theory of the Communist Party: Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1953), and Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1960).

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. THE NEW DIRECTIONS

Bailey, Stephen K. et. al. Research Frontiers in Politics and Government (1955).

Brecht, Arnold. Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought (1959).

Carter, G.M. and Herz, J.H. Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century (1961).

Cohen, Morris R. Reason and Nature (2nd ed., 1953).

Easton, David. The Political System (1953).

Friedrich, Carl J. Constitutional Government and Democracy (1950).

Heckscher, Gunnar. The Study of Comparative Government and Politics (1957).

Lerner, Daniel and Lasswell, Harold (editors). The Policy Sciences (1951).

Levy, Marion. The Structure of Society (1952).

Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man (1960).

Loewenstein, Karl. Political Power and the Governmental Process (1957).

MacIver, Robert M. The Web of Government (1947).

Macridis, Roy C. The Study of Comparative Government (1955).

Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (1961).

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure (1949).

Parsons, Talcott. The Social System (1951).

Van Dyke, Vernon. Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (1960).

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947).

White, Leonard D. (editor). The State of the Social Sciences (1956).

II. PARTIES

Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties (1958).

Shrman, Henry (editor). Interest Groups on Four Continents (1958).

Key, V. O., Jr. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups.

Leiserson, Avery. Parties and Politics (1958).

McKenzie, R. T. British Political Parties (1955).

Michels, Robert. Political Parties (1958).

Neumann, Sigmund. Editor. Modern Political Parties (1956).

Rossiter, Clinton. Parties and Politics in America (1960).

Schapiro, Leonard. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1960).

Truman, David. The Governmental Process (1951).

Williams, Philip. Politics in Postwar France (1954).

III. EXECUTIVES

Chapman, Brian. The Profession of Government (1960).

Gregoire, Roger. La Fonction Publique (1954).

Jennings, W. Ivor. Cabinet Government.

Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. The De Gaulle Republic (1960).

Marx, Fritz Morstein. The Administrative State (1957).

Merton, Robert K. (editor). A Reader in Bureaucracy (1952).

Meynaud, Jean (editor). "The Executive in the Modern State," International Social Science Bulletin. Vol. X, No. 2 (1958).

Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (1960).

Robson, W.A. Justice and Administrative Law (1951).

Siffin, W.J. (editor). Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (1957).

IV. THE ARMED FORCES

Andrzejewski, Stanislaw. Military Organization and Society (1954).

Girerdet, Raoul. La Société militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815-1939 (1953).

Howard, Michael (editor). Soldiers and Governments (1957).

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State (1957).

Janowitz, Morris. "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment," Administrative Science Quarterly (March, 1959), 473-93.

Lieuwen, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America (1960).

Panikkar, V. M. Problems of Indian Defense (1960).

Vagts, Alfred. Defense and Diplomacy (1956).

----- . A History of Militarism (1937).

V. POLITICS: WEST AND NON-WEST

Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S. The Politics of Developing Areas (1960).

Apter, David A. The Gold Coast in Transition (1957).

Ashford, Douglas. Political Change in Morocco (1961).

Braibanti, Ralph and Spengler, Joseph J. Traditions, Values, and Socio-Economic Development (1961).

Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation (1960).

Jennings, W. Ivor. The Approach to Self-Government (1956).

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (1958).

Park, Richard L. and Tinker, Irene (editors). Leadership and Political Institutions in India (1959).

